The origin and nature of the legal rights of spouses and children in the Scottish law of succession by Gardner, John Clanachan
t 
r")7qT.S. 
Th ORIGIN and N=E of the IL_]a:..1, 
and CHILDREN in the SCOTTISH o SIICCEL,'SIOIT. 
by 
JOIN C. CiaDNE2, B 
PL . 
The Origin and Nature of the Legal Rights of Spouses 
and Children in the Scottish Law of Succession. 
1. 
A Brief Survey of the Roman Law relating to Wills asid 
Succession. 
No treatise dealing with the origin and nature 
of legal rights in Scotland, especially those of legitim 
and jus relictae, can be complete without at least a brief 
survey of the Roman Law on this subject, for no institutions 
in our jurisprudence have more persistently and erroneously 
had their origins ascribed to the jurisprudence of Rome. 
Lot this, therefore, suffice as an apologia for the appar- 
ent irrelevancy of commencing this treatise with a glance 
at the early rules governing Wills and succession in Roman 
Law. 
It is difficult to realise that without the help 
of history, we merely strive to analyse our prima facie 
impressions in regard to the earliest form of Will. To a 
person familiar with the modern testament, it would seem 
a sine qua non that, whatever its form, the earliest type 
of Will must have taken effect at death only, that its 
provisions would be kept secret from those taking interest 
thereunder, and that it would ho revocable. Yet there was 
atime when none of these characteristics belonged to a 
Will. The earliest form of testament among the Romans 
took effect immediately on its execution; it was not 
secret, nor was it revocable. The reason for this may be 
found in the fact that intestate succession among the 
Romans/ 
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Romans is more ancient than testate succession,although 
many legal Writers believed the contrary. Among the 
Scottish Jurists Lord Bankton is a noteable instance 
in this respect. In his Institutes he propounds the 
doctrine that the first rule of succession was the 
express Will of the Proprietor, and that where no 
testament had been executed, the succession was regu- 
lated by the presumed Will of the Proprietor. It is 
obvious that Lord Bankton evolved such a theory from 
the ancient rule in the famous Twelve Tables of the 
Civil Law, which ran thus:- "Uti quisque legassot 
rei su.ae , ita jus o to' . And doubtless those other 
Writers, who believed succession by testament to be 
the more ancient, owed their opinions to the influence 
of this dictum. 
But, as moro careful Students of the Civil Law 
have pointed out, the earliest form of succession 
among the Romans did not recognise such a thing as a 
testament. Montesquieu in his 'Spirit of Laws thus 
describes the transition from this stage to the intro- 
-duction of a form of Will, which would not be incon- 
sistent with the existing laws of succession. "The 
order of succession having been established in conse- 
-quence of a political law, no citizen was allowed to 
break in upon it by his private Will; that is, in the 
first ages of Rome, he had not the power of making a 
testament. Yet it would have been hard to deprive 
him in his last moments of the friendly commerce of 
kind and beneficent actions. They therefore found a 
method of reconciling, in this respect the laws with 
the/ 
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the desires of the individual. Ho was permitted to 
dispose of his substance in an assembly of the people, 
and thus every testament was, in some sort, an act of 
the legislative power . This was the earliest form of 
Roman testament executed in the Comitia Calata. It 
was only very slowly and gradually that testaments 
gathered round thorn those features which are essential 
to the character of the modern Will. 
It would appear that,directly or indirectly 
Great Britain in common with all other European 
countries is indebted to the Roman Law for the con - 
-ception of a Will. Sir Henry Maine in his "Ancient 
Law" writes - 'The barbarians were confessedly stran- 
gers to any such conception as that of a Will. The 
best authorities agree that there is no trace of it in 
those parts of their codes which comprise the customs 
practised by them in their original seats, and in their 
subsequent settlements on the edge of the Roman Empire. 
But,soon after they became mixed with the population 
of the Roman provinces,they appropriated from the 
Imperial jurisprudence the conception of a Will, at 
first in part, and afterwards in all its integrity. 
The influence of the Church had much to do with this 
rapid assimilation. The ecclesiastical power had very 
early succeeded to those privileges of custody and 
registration of Testaments Which several of the heathen 
temples had enjoyed; and even thus early it was almost 
exclusively to private bequests that the religious 
foundations owed their temporal possessions. Hence 
it is that the decrees of the earliest Provincial 
Councils/ 
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Councils perpetually contain anathemas against those 
who deny the sanctity of Wills. Here, in England, 
Church influence was certainly chief among the causes 
which, by universal acknowledgment, have prevented 
that discontinuity in the history of testamentary 
law, which is sometimes believed to exist in the 
history of other provinces of jurisprudence. The 
jurisdiction over one class of Wills was delegated 
to the Ecclesiastical Courts, which applied to them, 
though not always intelligently, the principles of 
Roman jurisprudence; and, though neither the Courts 
of Common Law nor the Court of Chancery owned any 
positive obligation to follow the Ecclesiastical 
tribunals, they could not escape the potent influence 
of a system of settled rules in course of application 
by their side. The English Law of testamentary 
succession to personality has become a modified form 
of the dispensati6ns under which the inheritances of 
Roman citizens were administered". 
It was not, however, the type of Will executed 
before the Roman Comitia Curiata that gave the then 
primitive tribes of the various European countries 
their first conception of a testament. Every Student 
of Civil Law is familiar with the various stages 
through which the Roman Will passed before reaching 
maturity - the early unwritten testament of the 
Comitia Calata, gradually displaced by the Plebeian 
forni of mancipatory testament per aes et libram,also 
consisting originally simply of a ceremony involving 
no written documents, and finally the gradual alter - 
-ation/ 
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-ation and amelioration of this form of testament into 
the Praetorian Will. This Praetorian Will was based 
on the jus honorarium or equity of Rome, but the 
mancipatory testament in spite of its many defects, 
was never entirely superseded by this new form of Will, 
and the ingenuity of the Roman ,jurisconsults probably 
effected in this tostament the very improvements which 
the Praetors may have concurrently carried out by 
equity on the Praetorian Will. The latter, which came 
to be the one generally known as the Roman Will, was, 
however, the Will of the Eastern Empire only; and 
Savigny has shown that the old Mancipatory Testament 
with all its apparatus of conveyance; copper,and scales, 
continued to be the form in use in Western Europe down 
to the middle ages. 
Probably the most interesting aspect of the 
early testament is the question as to whether a 
testator should be permitted to exercise an unre- 
-stricted power in the disposal of his estate, or 
whether equity and the state should, in certain 
circumstances, retain restrictions on complete freedom 
of testing. We have already seen that the earliest 
laws of succession among the Romans did not permit of 
the disposal of property by Will. This was doubtless 
due to the strong position which the familia occupied 
in Roman civilization as a Social unit. Individual 
ownership of property was at that time scarcely Down, 
and it was considered to be the only possible rule of 
succession that on the death of the pater familias the 
common property of the familia, which had been managed 
by/ 
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by him, should remain with its other members who might 
be said to occupy a dual role as heirs and co- owners. 
It does not seem probable that the Romans ever intended 
that a testator should have an unrestricted power of 
disposal of his property by Will, and the uu.ti logasset 
of the Twelve Tables might quite well bo taken as being 
nothing more than a somewhat unfortunately expressed 
provision intended merely to establish a Will as a 
deed to be specially favoured in the eyes of the law. 
In view of the nature of the Roman social organisation 
at that timo, it scows quite as reasonable to suppose 
that the compilers of the Twelve Tables had simply 
never contemplated the possibility of a testator over- 
-looking his natural heirs, as to believe that they 
specially intended to give him the power to do this. 
Be that as it may, it soon became evident that 
proprietors of property were nothing loth to avail 
themselves of the letter of this provision, and the 
bonds of the familia proved inadequate to restrain 
testators from overlooking their natural heirs. The 
first reaction against this freedom of testing ivas 
instituted by the centumviral Court in the challenge 
it allowed to children of the testament of a, parent 
who bad causeles+ly disinherited them, or left them 
only a mere trifle in his testament; a challenge, how - 
-over, which, as it tool. the form of a reflection of 
the parent's sanity was not available if any other 
remedy, civil or praetorianicould be resorted to. 
It is interésting to observe that, at this stage, the 
law/ 
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law had not found it necessary to give children any 
right of succession in a parents estate which could be 
upheld against the provisions of his testament. The 
obligations and ties of the familia were even then 
considered to be so strong as to render the action of a 
pater familias who violated them in his testament 
sufficiently unnatural to savour of mental aberration. 
A remedy which found greater favour than the 
querula inofficiosi testamenti was that of bonorum 
possessio contra tabulas, by which the Praetors 
allowed sui heredes, who had been disinherited, to 
participate in the estate, in spite of the terms of 
the Willi. In the case of a Son, however, who was ono 
of the testator's sui heredes, the latter had either 
to institute or expressly disinherit him, otherwise 
the testament was a nullity and the child passed over 
had no need of the Praetorian remedy. 
p 
It was apparently the influence of the querula 
rather than that of the Praetorian edict, which led 
to the establishment of the rule that every child was 
entitled, notwithstanding the terms of his Father's 
testament, to at least a fourth of what would have come 
to him had his parent died intestate, unless it appeared 
that the parent had had adequate grounds for excluding 
him or limiting him to a smaller share. This fourth 
share was called the portio Legitima - statutory share, 
as Professor Muirhead explains in his 'Roman 
, Lilt; fourth was borrowed troni tho Lox 1+'aleiclia, 
which declared that every testamentary hoir should be 
entitled to have that proportion of the succession free 
from bequests to legatees. A parent was entitled to 
the same share of his child's estate, notwithstanding 
the terms of any testament which the latter might have 
made/ 
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made. It is interesting hero to note that unlike the. 
legitim of Scotland, the portio logi_tiwn was exigible 
from the Deceased's heritable as well as his moveable 
property. Justinian by his 18th Novel raised this 
portio legitima to one third at least, and one half 
where there wore five or more childrèn to participate. 
He also enacted that the challenge of a Will should 
e 
not be excluded, as in the earlier querula inofficiosi 
testamenti, where the testator had made advances to 
his child during his life or left him a legacy, which 
equalled in amount the portio legitima. Such a measure 
was apparently prompted by the theory that a child was 
entitled to recognition by his parent as one of his 
heirs, and that the law should not permit such recog- 
-nition to bo causelessly denied. 
Notwithstanding that so many Scottish lawyers 
have ascribed the origin of our rights of legitim and 
luE relictae to the Civil Law, apparently on no more 
substantial reasoning than that of the similarity 
between legitim and the Roman portio legitima, it is 
a fact that the conception of .ius relictae, as under - 
-stood in Scots Law, was quite unknown to the Romans. 
The early form of confar.reate marriage, which was 
rigidly adhered to by the patrician Romans till after 
the enacting of the Canuleian Law in 308 U.C., 
involved the passing of the Wife into her Husband's 
manus or power, assuming that he himself was a )ater 
familias. Any property she had of her owns which was 
a possible state of matters only if she had been 
independent before marriage - passed to him as a 
result/ 
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result of the marriage; if she had none, her pater 
familias provided her with a dowry, which shared tho 
same fate. Whatever she acquired while the marriage 
lasted, whether by her industry or otherwise, also fell 
to her Husband. Indeed so far as her patrimonial 
interests were concerned, she was in practically the 
same position as her children; and on her husband's 
death, according to Gaius, she had a share with them 
in his inheritance, not as his Widow, but as if she had 
been one of his Daughters. Later, in the time of 
Justinian, Husband and Wife had each their separate 
estate, which, on their death, descended to their 
respective heirs, without any share falling to the 
surviving spouse. The dowry of the wife and the 
donatio propter nuptias of the Husband were treated 
merely as forming a fund for the maintenance of the 
home, but did not in any way constitute a communio 
bon.orum, and on the death of either, the dowry or the 
donatio, as the case might be, became again a separato 
entity, and went to the heirs of the predeceasing 
spouse. According to Sir Henry Maine it was apparently 
left to the Roman Church of the lato empire to inculcato 
the principle that a Husband was morally bound to make 
some provision for his Wife in the event of her outliv- 
-ing him, so that she might not be dependent solely on 
what ho might see fit to leave her by his Will. 
It is plain therefore that although, from the time 
when the jus honorarium first began to be recognised, 
the Romans were confronted with restraints on complete 
freedom of testation, these were not nearly so rigid as 
the/ 
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the restrictions which resulted from tho legal rights 
of Scotland. For even in Justinian's time, in spite 
of the rule of the portico legitima, a testator might 
entirely exclude his heir from the succession, if he 
could give a sufficiently good reason for doing so; 
nor was his estate liable to any claim on behalf of 
the surviving spouse. 
11. 
TI. 
The Origin of Jus Rolictae and Legitim in Scotland. 
Most, if not all, of the early laws of Scotland are 
involved in obscurity. Various causes have been suggested 
as accounting for this fact. From the earliest times Scotland 
was a country of perpetual warfare and strife, successively 
subjected in different parts, to the jurisdiction of which - 
-ever tribe happened to be in the ascendent at the moment. 
The Battle of Carham in 1018, which established the final 
supremacy of the Scots, and brought Scotland under the rule 
of one people, did not provide any permanent state of peace. 
Unity within led merely to strife without, and the constant 
state of warfare, which existed for several centuries between 
Scotland and England was not conducive to fostering the study 
of jurisprudence. Printing was not introduced into Scotland 
until the Reformation; and until that timo the Roman Clergy 
were the judges in the consistorial Courts, and practically 
all their judicial records were Dither destroyed or carried 
abroad during the violent commotions which preceded the final 
subversion of Roman Catholicism in this country. The Lords 
of Session wore "mutable and ambulatory" until the Collego 
of Justice was perfected in 1540 by James V, and,like their 
confrères the Clergy, they conducted their proceedings with 
closed doors and in secret. 
It will therefore be seen that the Scottish juridical 
writers had great difficulties to contend with in the lack of 
anything in the nature of a ,jus ,scriptum to work upon. Never - 
-theless there can be little doubt that they did not make the 
most/ 
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most of such information as lay to their hands, and the 
fact that, almost without exception, none of the Scottish 
institutional writers attempted to avail himself of such 
assistance, meagre though it might have been as history 
could offer, was almost inevitably bound to lead to the 
many mistakes, which have been the frequent subject of 
comment by more recent jurists. Riddell in his 'Peerage 
and Consistorial Law" has thus characterised the failings 
of the early expositors of our Law : - "From the time of 
Lord Monboddo downwards, and indeed oven in that of Craig 
it would appear to have been too much the fashion among 
Scottish lawyers to indulge in a parade of foreign 
authorities, and in vague metaphysical speculation in the 
illustration of legal topics; and thus often catching at 
nubes et mania, instead of humbly condescending to burrow 
within their own soil, and excavating from thence the 
solid ore that is still to be found there, of far greater 
malleability and service ". And, as Chalmers remarks in 
his'Caledonia', "Without the certainty of facts, meta- 
_ 
-physics may darken, and system may distract, but law 
cannot be cultivated as a science, either for the agree- 
--able illustration of theory, or for the more useful 
purposes of practice ". Robertson, in his 'Law of 
Personal Succession' is of the opinion that "nothing has 
tended more to render the ancient law pf Scotland obscuro 
and uncertain than the opposite statements made upon this 
subject by the two eminent Writers Skene and Craig ". The 
latter appears to have held the Regiam Majostatom, which 
so many of our legal Writers have unhesitatingly founded 
on, almost in horror. Treating it merely as a transcript 
from Glanville's work on the law of England, he utterly 
refuses/ 
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refuses to regard it as in any way exhibiting the ancient 
and authentic law of Scotland. Skene on the other hand, 
prejudiced by his endeavour to support a hypothesis 
bearing on the much agitated question of the independence 
of the Scottish Monarchy, attempts to ascribe the author - 
-ship of the Regiam Majestatem to the reign of David 1, 
and thus to attribute to it an antiquity more remote 
than that of the works of Glanville. The cumulative 
effect of these numerous adverse factors is to render a 
research into the origin of any of our ancient legal 
customs an undertaking hedged about on every hand by 
difficulties and beset by innumerable perplexities. 
It has been said, that, before the Roman invasion 
of Britain, the customs, which had the place of laws, 
were the same in Scotland and in England, because the 
tribes which inhabited both were the same Celtic people. 
Such laws as were imposed by the Romans during their 
occupation are generally considered to have had no 
permanent duration. The conquest of the Saxons, however, 
made great changes in South Britain, but, as they made 
no conquests North of the two firths, the immemorial 
customs of Scotland remained there unchanged. Cosmo- 
lnnes expresses the opinion that 'Scotland at the 
different oras of her history used the laws of the 
people cognate to her then dominant race ". But such a 
theory does not appear to coincide with historical facts, 
as at one period Scotland had four different peoples 
ruling at the same time in different districts. It 
appears probable that when the Scots,' Picts, and Britons 
finally became united, these combined peoples adopted 
as/ 
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as a positive body of laws, the Scoto -Irish usages 
known as the Brehon laws. The evidence of the oxis- 
-tence in Scotland for a considerable period of those 
as 
rules of succession, recognised in Ireland=t the Law 
of Tanistry, seems to lend support to such a theory. 
It is true that there has never been discovered in 
Scotland any great formal record of Celtic custom like 
the Brehon laws in Ireland, and other similar laws in 
Wales. But the remnants which have survived of a set 
of laws known as the Loges inter Brettos et Scotos 
seem to indicate the broad lines of a similar system. 
The South -East of Scotland, however, did not 
escape from the Anglo Saxon conquest, and it would 
appear reasonable to suppose that the earliest laws in 
that part of the country consisted of the same stock of 
Teutonic customs as were then used in England. "One 
must indeed be ignorant of the history of our law ", 
wrote Lord Eames, "who does not know that the laws of 
Scotland and England were originally the same almost in 
every particular" . It is doubtful if this axiom was 
intended to apply to such an early period in the history 
of the laws of the two countries, and indeed Chalmers 
considers that this position only began to be true at 
the commencement of the 12th century, when the Sons of 
Malcolm Canmore, the children of a Saxon 'Princess, 
came in successively, by the aid of a Saxon power, from 
the North of England, and brought with them the customs 
and laws of England, as they were then understood and 
practised. But there does not seem any reason to dis- 
believe that the laws of the South -East of Scotland and 
the laws of England, as the customs of a cognate people, 
were/ 
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wore very similar from the time of the Anglo Saxon 
conquest; for several of our legal rules in use today 
appear to owe their origin to Teutonic customs. 
The introduction into both countries of Norman 
Law would further any such similarity. Moreover, 
Norman Law had many points in common with Anglo Saxon 
Law, and it is now exceedingly difficult to tell what 
belonged to the original foundation and what to the 
Scoto- Norman superstructure. Certain it is that the 
Celtic Law gradually died out, and the Scoto - Norman 
Law came to affott every branch of our jurisprudence. 
Ultimately the Scoto- Norman Law in Scotland must have 
come to be almost identical with the Anglo -Norman Law 
in England. For both laws were composed chiefly of 
Norman law grafted on Anglo -Saxon law, and both agreed 
in neglecting the Celtic law. 
The early history of testate succession in 
Scotland shares the obscurity which shrouds all our 
ancient laws. We have no clear record of the incep- 
-tion and development of a Last Will in this country. 
It is impossible to trace its progress and different 
phases, as has been done in the history of Roman 
jurisprudence. In England, Blackstone informs us, 
the power of bequeathing by testament was co -oval with 
the first rudiments of the law, for there are no 
records of a time when this was not known. In Scot- 
-land, it is more difficult to determine whether the 
conception of a Will has been recognised in some form 
since the first rudiments of law. If the Anglo- Saxons 
in England were familiar with a Last Will, it seems 
probable/ 
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probable that it would also be known in the South -East 
of Scotland. North of the Firth of Forth, however, 
in what might be called Celtic Scotland, there is room 
for more doubt as to whether the power of bequeattiíng 
by testament was always recognised. Sir Henry Maine, 
in his "Early History of Institutions', says that the 
conception of a Will is present in the tracts of the 
Brehons and attributes its introduction into their laws 
to the influence of the Civil Law diffused by the Roman 
Church. But there does not seem to be any evidence in 
the "Ancient Laws of Ireland' of directing a succession 
by Will, and practically the only mention that is made 
of it in the Senchus Mor is in connection with giving 
effect to directions contained therein respecting the 
testator's burial. 
In spite of the difficulty in arriving at any 
definite and authentic information about the early 
rules of testation in Scotland, there seem little 
doubt that our Country has never known a'period when 
an unrestrained power of disposal by Will of the whole 
of the Testator's estate was permitted, assuming him 
to have a Wife and family. Indeed it follows ration - 
-ally that, as probably all the peoples of Northern 
Europe, like the Romans, had some principles of 
succession or division of property on a death before 
they understood the conception of a Will, the earliest 
Wills would not be allowed to dispose with absolute 
freedom of a dead man's assets. The question of what 
a testator could dispose of by Will was doubtless 
originally regulated not by the fact that he possessed 
or did not possess a Wife and children, but by the 
early/ 
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early laws of property. The testator would almost 
certainly have y a greater power of disposal of property 
acquired by his own efforts than of property allotted 
to him as a:member of the tribe, and it might quite 
well be contended that the conception of a Will could 
not be recognised until the people adopting it had 
become familiar with the doctrine of private ownership 
,of property. The Church has been credited with intro - 
-during both these conceptions to most of the communi- 
ties beyond the Roman Empire, held together by the 
primitive tie of consanguinity. It appears, however, 
from the ''Ancient Laws of 'Ireland' that in certain 
circumstances a tribesman might even grant, contract 
or bequest a certain quantity of the tribe land, allott- 
-ed to him. The circumstances in which he might do 
this are not clear, owing to the obscurity and contra- 
-dictory nature of the rules laid down, but there seems 
little doubt that the grantee primarily contemplated 
was the Church. For, as Sir Henry Maine points out, 
'The Will, the contract, and the separate ownership 
were, in fact, indispensable to the Church as the 
donee of pious gifts; and they were also essential 
and characteristic elements in the civilization amid 
which the Church had been reared to maturity'. 
There does not appear to be any evidence in the 
early Celtic Laws, (which seem at one time to have been 
prevalent in most of Scotland), of a Widow and children 
having any claims on a Deceased's estate, which would 
act as restraints on his freedom of testing; and indeed 
the law of Tanistry, which, if it was not the only 
form of succession known to the Celts, was the most 
usual practice, did not recognise them as successors. 
18. 
The first authentic evidence of the existence in 
Scotland of any law giving the Widow and children inde- 
- feasible rights in a deceased's estate is to be found 
in the Regiam Mejestatem and the Loges Ouatuor Burgorum. 
Although both these works have been ascribed to the reign 
of David I, it is by no means certain that they are of an 
equal antiquity. The Regiam ltiajestatem seems to be now 
generally accepted as being merely a copy of Glanville's 
work on the'law of England, though for centuries the 
question of its superior antiquity has been the subject 
of a controversy, which divided the opinions of our 
greatest Writers. Even at the present day there is still 
considerable room for doubt as to whether it is an orig- 
-inal work, and as to when it was written. The Loges 
Quatuor Burgorum, on the other hand, seem to afford more 
cause for believing that they had been sanctioned as a 
code of laws in Scotland by the authority of David 1. 
There is, of course, no ground for believing that this 
code was a creation of King David. He was a wise law 
giver, rather than a law maker; and there appears to be 
sufficient similarity between these laws and the privi- 
--loges and customs, which obtained in some of the English 
Burghs from the time of Henry,.l , to warrant the conclusion 
that they were framed in accordance with usages already 
known and established. Chalmers considers that these 
Burgh Laws bear upon the face of them, a much more modern 
air than the early age in Scotland of David 1 could pro- 
perly exhibit. Indeed it has been suggested that the 
privileges and customs in the Leges Burgorum were 
borrowed from rules obtaining in many Burghs on the 
Continent. A strong similarity has also been observed 
between/ 
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between these laws and the usages of Newcastle -on -Tyne, 
as contained in "The Laws and customs which the 
burgesses of Newcastle -on -Tyne had in the time of Henry 
(1) ring of England, and which they ought to have" - 
a document, of which two ancient transcripts aro still 
preserved, one among the Tower records of Henry 11, 
and the other in the Cartulary of the Monastery of 
Tynemouth. John Hodson Hinde, the author of a paper on 
the Early 11I nicipal History of Newcastle, expresses the 
opinion that this document was the result of an inquiry 
into these customs instituted by King-David of-Scotland, 
and to have been the foundation of his Loges Burgorum. 
This hypothesis has a certain air of probability and 
seems to be not inconsistent with the known vestiges of 
these ancient institutions. It also seems likely that 
King David, if he did adopt such a procedure in forming 
a code of laws for his favourite Burghs in Scotland,would 
have revised and extended these already existing privil- 
-egos of the Burgh of Newcastle by comparing them with 
those of other similar communities. 
Dr. David Baird Smith, however, writing in the 
Scottish Historical Review of April 1924 on the 
,etrait Lignager in Scotland, arrives at the conclusion 
that the early date sometimes assigned to the Le gos 
Çuattuor Burgorum cannot be accepted without some further 
consideration. He quotes Dr. Maitland Thomson's view on 
this matter as follows:- 'But, putting it at the lowest, 
the code of laws of the Four Burghs, as we have it, is 
not later than the time of the Alexanders, and represents 
a body of custom, which had been growing up in Scotland 
since/ 
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since the days of David 1; much of it having grown up long 
before in other countries and brought here by immigrants. 
For, that the influx of foreigners is responsible to some 
extent for the rapid growth of the Scottish burgh system, 
that it was they who inoculated the infant community with 
the eoiporate spirit, which so soon made them a power in 
the land, may be taken as certain ". Dr. Smith himself 
considers that, "Evidence of external influences at a 
formative period may be found, e.g., in the fact that 
a Fleming was the first baillie of St. Andrews and that 
the Chartulary of St. Andrews''Priory contains references 
to a number of Flemings as residents. The main influence 
however", he says, Iwas probably derived from the eleventh 
and twelfth century Norman immigrants ". 
Professor Dove Wilson, on the other hand, in an 
article on the 'Historical Development of Scots Law ", 
which appeared in 1896 in Volume V111 of the Juridical 
Review, regards the laws in this code as almost. purely 
Anglo Saxon in their origin and nature. He considers 
that the four Burghs were originally-Anglo Saxon Settle - 
-ments and that the Leges Quat uor Burgorum give some 
conception of what law prevailed before the Normans made 
their way into the country. In support of this contention 
he points out that the vernacular version of these laws 
contains many Anglo Saxon words, that the whole system 
of land tenure described therein is allodial, and that 
they show no trace of the Norman system of brieves. He 
admits that there are many additions and insertions 
which are plainly due to Norman or Feudal influences. 
"When it is remembered', he writes, 'that the earliest 
date, at which any kind of manuscript of these laws could 
have / 
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have been made out, was at least a century after Norman 
ideas were in fashion: and that these ideas had worked for 
at least another century before the existing manuscripts 
were written down, it is plain that we must expect to 
have difficulty in unearthing the original Anglo Saxon 
element ". 
In Chapter 115 of this code, the principle of our 
law of succession in moveables, whereby a portion is 
reserved as the right of children, is enunciated, and, so 
far as it goes, accurately describes the right known as 
legitim, at the present day. This law, which is remark- 
-able for its statement of the antiquity already assigned 
to the custom is as follows : - "Consuetudo est in omnibus 
burgis Scocie a tempore de quo non extat memoria in 
contrarium quod si aliquis burgensis liberos procreaverit 
de uxore sua legitima et ipse docedat tercia pars omnium 
bonorum debetur filiis et filiabus ipsorum.. Legitimus 
autem filius primogenitus et heros ejusdem viri et wcoris 
habebit eandem porcionem bonorum quam et filii alii 
videlicet equalem cum aliis liberis nisi ipse primogenitus 
fuerit foris-familiatus". The law dots not say what 
becomes of the other thirds, but, in view of the corres- 
-ponding statement on this subject in the Regiam Majes- 
-tatem, it may be presumed the disposal of them was the 
same as that obtaining in the present day. It is,however, 
not so clear as to what was done when only the wife or 
the children survived and not both of them. 
Robertson is of the opinion that this law indi- 
-cates that there had been a custom in the Burghs of 
Scotland relative to the law of succession different 
from/ 
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from the general law, as there was in various party of 
England. But he adds; "For a long period no trace of 
such.custom has been 1cn wn in Scotland, and there has 
been but one rule of law in that country in regard to 
the succession in personal estate ". Such a hypothesis 
has. at first sight, a certain air of probability. For 
a distinction of a similar nature seems to have been 
made in the burghs of Normandy in regard to a wife's 
share in burgage property. In this latter case,howover, 
the distinction was of a rather different nature, con - 
-sisting in the custom of recognising a wife as having 
a community right with her husband in burgage property 
acquired jointly. According to Brissaud she was debarred 
by the law of Normandy from any share during the marriage 
in joint aequests of other property. In the caso of the 
Loges Burgorum, however, the more probable theory is that 
the wording of the law in question was partly copied from 
some set of laws in use in other burghs, and did not 
therefore imply any difference between the'law of succes- 
sion as to personal estate in burghs and personal estate 
in other parts of the country. 
an. the Regiam Majestatem the division of a 
deceased's estate is declared to be tripartite - one 
third to the children, one third to the Wife, and one 
third as the dead's part. This law deals with the wife's 
share as well as that of the children, and appears to be 
the first authentic evidence of the existence in Scotland 
of the legal right now known as jus relictae. In this 
case the claims of the wife and children seem to operate 
together, and this tends to substantiate the belief that, 
though the children's claim only is mentioned in the 
Loges/ 
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'Legos I3urgorum the wife also would be entitled to her 
third from the estate. 
These rights of the wife and children in a dead 
man's estate do not appear to be indigenous to our law, 
for there is no trace of them in the early Celtic Laws, 
which have come down to us. The Brehon Laws give an 
indication of the Celtic practices in this matter, and 
the Cain Lanallina, or Cain -Law of Social connexions, 
set forth therein shows that the Celtic Law demanded 
for the Mother a position equal to that of the father, 
and that they had each their separate estates. On the 
dissolution of the marriage each party regained his or 
her own estate intact, having restitution made for any 
part thereof which had been consumed by the other party 
and taking any increase that had accrued during the 
marriage. How then, and from what source did legitim 
and jus relictae corn to be adopted into Scots Law? 
The most prevalent theory on this subject is 
that these rights, or at any rate the right of legitim 
was directly borrowed from the Corpus Juris. Legitim 
has been stated to be just a modified form of the 
testamentum inofficiosum and portio legitima, origin - 
-ally introduced into the law of Rome, as we have seen, 
by the praetors as an equitable modification of the 
absolute right of testing permitted by the strict law, 
and to have come into Scotland at some time prior to 
the Reformation, either through the Canon Law, or the 
Droit Coutumier of Northern France. In the reported 
Cases of the 17th and 18th centuries this doctrine 
appears to be most generally ascribed to a Roman origin. 
Most/ 
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Most of our earlier institutional Writers seem to have 
unhesitatingly taken this view, probably because of the 
great similarity between legitim and the portio legitima 
of the Romans (indeed the name legitim is derived from 
the name given to the Roman share) and the extensive 
adoption in our law of so many of the principles of 
Roman jurisprudence. Even Fraser, in his book on the 
"Law of the Personal and Domestic Relations ", after 
starting a much more probable line of reseaich in a 
detailed examination of the system of communion of goods 
between husband and wife, which obtained on the continent 
and its introduction into this country, and drawing a 
somewhat unwarrantable conclusion from his researches, 
announces that 'there is high authority for the doctrino 
that the immediate origin of the Scotch law of legitim 
was the jurisprudence of Rome'". Unfortunately he omits 
to state what constitutes this high authority. 
At the same time, it is rather extraordinary 
in view of the almost insurmountable obstacles to this 
theory, which will be subsequently dealt with, that the 
idea of a Roman origin of legitim should have taken such 
deep root among our jurists. We find Hope, for instance, 
in his Minor Practicks, explaining that the reason there 
is no legitim from the mother's estate is because she 
does not have the children in potestate as the father 
does: A significant example of the belief in this 
theory at the present day is to be found in a communi- 
-cation made on 16th February 1924 to the General 
Assembly of the Society of Comparative Legislation 
in 
Pa : ofessor of Comparative Civil Law there, 




appeared in the Juridical Review of December 1925. 
Dealing with the influence of Roman law on Scots law, 
Professor Lovy- Ullmann remarks : - "Lastly the law of 
succession, in so far as it has not been modified by 
feudal principles presents to us institutions, the 
names of which we have abandoned, while the Scots 
have preserved them, such as the legitime, our 
reserve hereditaire, still called in Scotland legitim 
It seems obvious that Professor L vy- 
Ullmann thinks that the French legitime , which was 
adopted from the Roman law, and the Scottish legitim, 
have the same origin. But Brissaud in his History 
of French 'Private law tells us that ielgitime , which 
he states to be a Roman institution, was introduced 
on the Continent into the countries of Customs towards 
the middle of the 13th century. Yet there seems to be 
irrefutable evidence of the existence of a children's 
share in Scotland in the 12th century, and the Leges 
Burgorum, possibly as early as the reign of David 1, 
state it to have been a custom in this country beyond 
the memory of man. It appears, moreover, to be most 
generally accepted that the modification of the Roman 
law of succession, which forms the foundation of our 
present system of succession in mobilibus, had a 
continental source, which was not extensively drawn 
upon till the 15th or 16th centuries. It therefore 
seems extremely improbable that the Roman institution 
of legitim could have been introduced into Scotland 
before it had been accepted in those countries on the 
continent, which adopted it. 
It/ 
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It is true that there were few branches of our 
law which were not affected by Roman legal principles, 
but there seems to be a universal tendency to over- 
estimate the extent to which those came to prevail. In 
many instances, their effect was a mere veneer on the 
surface, and in the law of succession we appear to have 
adapted the Roman names , but not; Oman principles. 
Blindness to this fact seems to account largely for the 
So .prevalent tendency to trace the origin of legitim and 
jus relictae to the Roman law. 
Present day research has raised some doubts as 
to whether Roman law was not drawn upon in this country 
at a much earlier date than that at which it is usually 
supposed to have become the determining influence of our 
jurisprudence. As yet, however, there is not 'sufficient 
evidence to overthrow the older theory. Robertson in his 
Law of Personal Succession offers the hypothesis that 
Roman law was first extensively introduced in Scotland 
during the centuries of intimate political relationship 
which obtained between our country and France. "In 1532 ", 
he says, "Legislature had instituted the college of 
Justice on the model of the 'Parliament of 'Paris, and 
soon after the marriage of Mary to the Dauphin in 1558, 
Frenchmen and Scotchmen were mutually maturalised in the 
two countries''. Henry 11 of France seems to have 
regarded this marriage as inseparably uniting Scotland 
and France. In his ordonnance granting the privileges 
of naturalization to Scotsmen in France, which is 
printed in our statute book in an act of 1558 c. 66, he 
says "Au moyen de quay estans les Subjects des deux 
royaumes/ 
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royaumes (qui oit jusques icy & des long temps 
ordinairement communiqué ensemble veseu en mutuelle 
amitié & intelligence, favorise & secouru les uns les 
autres) par L'approche des maisons de France & d'Escosse, 
tellement unis ensemble, que nous les estimons comme une 
mesme chose ". Robertson concludes by adding that, as 
we find in France at that period several of those modifi- 
-cations of the civil law which are in full force in 
Scotland to this day, it is not unreasonable to believe 
that we have derived them from that country. 
In his recent book on the Parochial Law of Tithes, 
however, the Reverend Thomas Miller, states a discovery, 
made in the course of his researches, which seems to 
establish the fact that a considerable body of Roman law 
and Canon law was adopted as authoritative law in Scotland 
by David 1. Mr. Miller discovered in the archives of the 
Abbey of St. Andrews a deed by which Robert, Bishop of St. 
Andrews in the reign of David 1, and by that King's 
authority, directs those Churchmen and Judges who were 
subject to his orders to conform to a book which he names 
the Exceptiones Ecclesiasticarum Regularum. 
Mr. Miller has identified this book, (which con- 
-sisted partly of Canon law and partly of Roman law and 
comprised texts from the Theodosian Code, from all the 
compilations of Justinian - the Institutes, Code,Pandects 
and Novels, and included in these the praetors edict, 
nautae, caupones , stabularii) , with the Decrefum or the 
Panormie, (or both combined) of Yves de Chartres, the 
greatest Canon lawyer of that period. Mr. Miller supports 





David 1, who had traveller in France, and Yves de 
Chartres, who had at that time achieved considerable 
fall* throughout Christendom by his writings, and on 
account of the monks whom he sent as missionaries, and 
the convents and Churches he established in many 
countries including Scotland. He further adduces in 
support of this theory the self interest of David on 
the grounds that by recommending the book of Yves de 
Chartres in Scotlandithe King could rest his royal 
prerogative upon the authority of the most celebrated 
text .of the middle ages. This was the passage of the 
Institutes usually cited as De constitutionibus 
prin.cipum which runs thus Sed et 'cjliod principi 
placuit legis habet vigorem ". It seems to have been 
the practice of almost every King in the middle ages 
both in the East andt in the West, to rely for support 
on this text. 
It is interesting to note that Dr. David Patrick 
in his "Statutes of the Scottish Church ", had previously 
pointed out that, through this book, we had a compendium 
of Roman Canon law in Scotland in the 12th century, 
although he considered the "Exceptiones Ecclesiasticarum 
Regularum to be the Excerptiones Ecgberhti Eburacensis - 
the famous selection of church canons attributed to 
Egbert of York. Dr. Patrick, however, seems to have 
formed this theory as a result of speculation only and 
without any knowledge of the contents of the book. In 
advancing it, he says, "If this be so, we have in use 
in 12th century Scotland a compendium of RomYan Canon 
law, redacted in England, hundreds of years before 
Scotland, under French guidance, had begun to look to 




Mr. Miller's contention, however, which has been 
favourably commented on by Professor Levy -Ullmann in the 
communication already referred to, does not of course 
prove that Roman legal principles were adopted to any 
appreciable extent in our country at so early a date, 
though his discovery certainly opens up a new vista of 
research in connection with this question. It would 
seem rather that, if the Exceptions did exercise any 
influence in Scotland in the reign of David 1, this 
would be confined to ecclesiastical matters. Moreover, 
the use.of the words "a teniore de quo non extat memoria 
in contrarium" to describe the antiquity of the custom 
in the Loges 13urgorum, which allowed children a one third 
share in their father's estate, would surely preclude the 
possibility of this rule having been adopted from King 
David's newly imported Roman Law. 
It does not seem ever to have been contemplated 
that the conception of legitim could have been intro - 
-duced into Scotland by the Romans, at the time of their 
invasion of this country, and have survived the conflict- 
-ing influerees of the various laws to which Scotland was 
subsequently subjected. And indeed such a theory would 
appear in the highest degree improbable. For though the 
excellence of the Roman laws would assist their compulsory 
acceptance by a vanquished people, the Romans never 
achieved in Scotland anything resembling such a permanent 
subjugation of the inhabitants as would ensure of their 
legislation having any lasting effect. Nor is it likely 
that the comparatively primitive tribes, who inhabited 
our country at that time, and who were strangers to 
anything/ 
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anything resembling an established system of jurispru- 
denee, would be capable of assimilating the Roman law 
to an extent sufficient for its influence to attain any 
measure of periianancy. It is also evident that the 
numerous systems of laws and customs which were imposed 
on Scotland after the departure of the Romans, would 
seriously militate against the survivance of any of the 
Roman institutions. 
What is perhaps the most formidable argument of 
all, höwever, against the theory of a Roman origin for 
,our right of legitim has been advanced by Professor 
Cloudy in a lecture delivered at "Oxford in 1894 on the 
"Fate of the Roman Law North and South of the Tweed ". . 
He points out that in addition to the dissimilarities 
between the Scottish legitim and the Roman portio 
legitira, the notion of the jus relictae, which is 
bound up with that of legitim, was , as we have already 
seen, wholly unknown to the Romans.. It is true that 
the Leges Burgorum speak only of the children's share 
and say nothing of a portion for the widow, but at the 
same time, the wording of the law, which deals with this 
matter, gives no reason to believe that this was because 
the widow's share was not recognised at that time. The 
Regiam Majestatem, which has never been satisfactorily 
disproved to be a contemporary of the Leges Burgorum 
mentions the widow's share as well as that of the 
children, and in England, at the time when these rights 
were also in force there, they are invariably mentioned 
together. Throughout the whole range. of Scottish 
jurisprudence the Leges Burgorum seem to be the only 
instance of a complete statement regarding the division 
of/ 
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of a dead man's estate, which mentions the children's 
right therein and omits that of the widow, and, as has 
already been pointed out, there does not seem any room 
for the view that such an omission was occasioned by 
the fact that at that date the widow was not recognised 
as having any such claim. It is also significant to 
note that several writers, amongst whom is Professor 
Dove Wilson, refer to the passage in the Loges Burgorum 
as being evidence of the existence of a tripartite 
division in Scotland at that date. 
It has also been suggested that legitim and jus 
relictae may have been introduced into Scotland by means 
of the Canon law, but there is little to support such a 
view. There does not seem to have been any extensive 
adoption of the Canon law in Scotland before the time of 
David I, during whose reign Bishops and Episcopal Courts 
were introduced into our country, and, as has already 
been pointed out, the reference to legitim in the Loges 
Burgorum undoubtedly conveys the impression that it was 
a rule which had obtained in Scotland long prior to that 
date. There is also the same objection that has been 
advanced against the theory of the introduction of 
legitim and .jus relictae by the Roman law, namely that 
the latter would be unknown to the Canon lawyers also, 
for they merely adapted the Roman law to the needs of 
the Church. Further, as Pollock and Maitland, dealing 
with this question in connection with the introduction 
of these rights into England, have pointed out, 'The 
Canenist was not interested in the maintenance of the 
old restraints. His training in Roman law might indeed 
teach him that the claims of children should set limits 
to/ 
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to a father's testamentary power, but 'Wife's part', 
'bairns part', and 'dead's part' cannot be found in 
the Institutes; besides, the Church had legacies to 
gain by ignoring the old limits ". 
Had the Canonists introduced these rights into 
Scotland, it would only be reasonable to expect to 
find some trace of them in the early Statutes of our 
Church, but no such trace exists. There is indeed a 
General Statute of 1420 passed in a Provincial Synod 
and General Council, held in Perth, to enact a declar- 
-ation in respect of the canonical portion due on 
account of the Confirmation of testaments, which 
decided that it was the practice to divide the personal 
effects of a deceased into three equal portions, which 
constituted the wife's share, the childrens share and 
the But there is nothing in any of these 
Statutes to support the view that legitim and jus 
relictae had been introduced by the Canonists, or were 
specially enforced by them. 
Before considering any further theories as to the 
origin of legitim and jus relictae in Scotland, it is 
probably advisable to determine first what significance 
is to be attached to the use of the words "a tempere 
de quo non oxtat memoria in contrarium ", in the Leo-es 
Burgorum, to describe the antiquity of legitim. Were 
these words deliberately used by the compiler of these 
laws, or were they merely copied from the phraseology 
of other Burgh laws on which our lieges ç)uattuor Burgorum 
were based? If they were a mere adoption of an expres- 
sion used elsewhere, it would be difficult to say 
whether/ 
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whether the custom of legitim had obtained in Scotland 
before the time of David 1 or not. Such a view would 
further raise the question as to whether this custom 
had been introduced by David Greet into this country 
from France, as a result of his travels there, or 
borrowed from England. Robertson is of opinion that 
this expression furnishes a strong reason to conclude 
that the custom of legitim had been adopted from 
England, for, he says:- "This is precisely the mode 
in which their writers describe the legal memory of the 
English law ". Unfortunately, however, he does not state 
whether there is a probability that this custom was 
taken_from Burgh laws, which obtained in England, or 
whether it had more likely been adopted from that 
country at a time sufficiently early to justify the 
use of such an expression, at that date, as to its 
antiquity. As will be shown subsequently, there 
appears to be sufficient evidence that legitim and jus 
relictae, (if they were borrowed from England) were 
adopted at an earlier age than that of David 1, to make 
it appear as if the compiler of the Leges Burgorum had 
really been desirous of calling attention to the 
antiquity of legitim in Scotland. Nor is there 
apparently any evidence which would point to the 
expression in the Leges Burgorum as being nothing but 
a slavish copying of a phrase used elsewhere. 
We now come to the most probable theory which 
has yet been suggested, to account for the origin in 
Scotland of legitim and jil,s relictae, namely that they 
were introduced into our country from England. It is 
well known that these rights existed in England in the 
13th century, and fairly certain that they were known 
in the twelfth, but there is considerable doubt as to 
how/ 
how much further back they can be traced. Bede tells 
._a. story of a Northumbrian who rose from the dead and 
divided his property into three shares, reserving one 
for himself, while one was made over to his wife and 
another to his children. Such an anecdote, however, 
can not be regarded as evidence that those rights 
existed in England as early as the time of Bode, who 
wrote in the 8th century. Glanville states that by 
the common law as it stood in the reign of Henry 11 a 
dead man's goods were to be divided into three equal 
parts, of which one went to his children, another to 
his wife and the third was at his own disposal. The 
shares of the wife and children were called their 
`reasonable parts: 
This continued to be the law at the time of the 
Magna Carta, which, in regulating the disposal of a 
tenant -in- chief's estate, declared that the King's 
debts should first be paid and that if nothing be owing 
to the Crown, '' oml.iia catalla cedunt defu.ncto salvis 
uxori ipsius et pueris suis rationabilibus partibus 
suis'. Blackstone tells us that this right of the 
wife and children was still held to be the universal 
or common law in the reign of Edward ill, though it was 
frequently pleaded as the local custom of Berks, Devon 
and other counties. 'Sir Henry .Pinch' , he says, "lays 
it down expressly in the reign of Charles the first, to 
be the general law of the land. But this law is at 
present altered by imperceptible degrees, and the 
deceased may now by Will bequeath the whole of his 
goods and chattels; though we cannot trace out when 
first this alteration began. Indeed Sir Edward Coke 
is of opinion that this never was the general law, but 
only/ 
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only obtained in particular places by special custom; 
and to establish that doctrine he relies on a passage 
in Bracton, which in truth, when compared with the 
context makes directly against his opinion. For Bracton 
lays down the doctrine of the reasonable part to be the 
common law; but mentions that as a particular exception, 
which Sir Edward Coke has hastily cited for the general 
rule. And Glanville, Magna Carta, Fleta, the Year- books, 
Fitzherbert,and Finch do all agree with Bracton that 
this right to the pars rationabilis was by the common 
law: which also continues to this day to be the general 
law of our sister kingdom of Scotland ". It is inter- 
-esting to note that this custom obtained in the pro - 
-vince of York, the principality of Wales, and the City 
of London, until a comparatively late date and had 
finally to be abolished in these places by Statute, in 
order to bring them into conformity with the rest of the 
Kingdom. 
How then did this doctrine of the reasonable . 
parts, which is precisely the same as our doctrine of 
legitim and jus relictae , come into England? We have 
already seen that such vestiges of the Ancient Celtic 
laws, as have come down to us, show no trace of having 
recognised this rule. It may therefore be assumed with 
comparative safety that it was not in existence in 
England before the Anglo Saxon conquest. It was there - 
-Core not indigenous to England any more than it was to 
Scotland, and on that account must have been adopted 
from some foreign source. 
We have already disposed of the theory of a 
Roman origin of this custom in Scotland, and the 
arguments/ 
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arguments used in that connection are equally appli- 
-cable to England. It is true, of course, that the 
'Romans made a much more effectual occupation of 
England than they did in Scotland. Blackstone, who 
seems to suggest that there is a possibility of this 
doctrine having had a Roman origin in England, says 
that, if it was derived from the Roman law of 
succession, it had been drawn from that source much 
earlier than the time of Justinian, from whose con- 
-stitutions in many points it very considerably 
differs. He offers the hypothesis that it may have 
emerged from the Roman usages introduced into England 
in the time of Claudius Caesar, who established a 
colony in that country to instruct the natives in legal 
knowledge; which usages were inculcated and diffused 
by Papinian, who presided at York as praefectus 
praetorio under the emperors Severus and Caracalla, and 
were continued by his successors till the final depar- 
-ture of the Romans from Britain. 
Pollock and Maitland, however, stato that there 
is no real evidence that the Roman Institutions survived 
in England for any time after the Romans departed. They 
point out that it is difficult to believe that civil 
institutions remained continuous in a country where the 
discontinuity of ecclesiastical affairs is so pointedly 
marked , and in an age when the Church was far more 
stable and compact than any civil institutions whatever: 
nor does there appear to be any trace of the jurispru- 
-dence of Rome, as distinct from the precepts and tra- 
-ditions of the Roman Church, in the earliest Anglo- 
Saxon documents. It has also to be kept in mind that, 
at a later age when the influence of the Romani law was 
spreading/ 
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spreading over the whole of Europe, it did not meet 
with any ready acceptance in England, which country 
had by thon a very completo body of common law. And, 
in any case, as has previously been pointed out, a 
Roman .origin cannot be accepted as accounting for the 
Widow's share; nor is there any evidence to give rise 
to a belief that the children's share may have had a 
separato origin, and that this is to be found in the 
jurisprudence of Rome. 
The two theories still remaining to be examined 
are (first) that the division by reasonable parts was 
a Teutonic institution introduced by the Anglo- Saxons 
and (second) that it was a custom of early French law 
brought into England through Norman influences. 
In an article on the "Historical Development of 
Scots Law" , which appeared in 1396 in Volume V111 of 
the Juridical Review, Professor Dove Wilson has, as we 
venture to think, rather unhesitatingly and emphati- 
cally accepted the former theory. Although the 
passage dealing with this matter is fairly long, it 
might be well for its proper consideration that so 
much of it as is relevant should be quoted here. 
'In moveable succession", he says , speaking of 
the lieges Burgorum4 , 'we find one of the most interest - 
-ing provisions. There is distinct mention of the 
tripartite division (still existing in Scotland) where- 
-by, when a father died leaving widow and children, one 
third of the goods went to the widow, one third was 
divided among the children, whether sons or daughters, 
and/ 
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and ono third might be bequeathed by Will - the dead's 
part. This division, however, was much older in Anglo- 
Saxon Scotland than the oldest date to which we have 
any right to assign the earliest part of the written 
Burgh Laws, and it existed widely in other Germanic 
races. Possibly it applied at an early date with us, 
as it did-in other places, both to immoveables and 
moveables. The earliest authentic trace of it with us 
is in the often quoted passage of Bede, written about 
the end of the 8th century. Speaking of the customs of 
Northumbria (which it will be rernombered then included 
Scotland to the Firth of Forth) Bede mentions a case of 
succession in the following terms:- 'Omnem quam 
pos ederat substantiam in tres divisit portiones e 
quibus unam con,jugi, alteram filius tradidit, tertiam 
sibi ipso retentans statim pauperibus distribuit' . The 
Saxon version has in place of the words rsibi ipse 
retentans words signifying 44which belonged to him: 
Somner, who quotes this passage, remarks on it: 'The 
third part is there said to belong to him, plainly 
insinuating that the other two as rightly appertained to 
his wife and children, each of them a third. But withal 
observe that this is the act of an housekeeper in the 
province or region of Northumberland and 
such a testimony indeed it is as makes much (I confesso) 
for the antiquity of that custom yet (A.D. 1660) sur- 
-viving and current in these northern quarters of the 
Kingdom' . As is well known, the custom of the pro- 
vince of York recognised the tripartite division of' 
moveables down to a so anwhat later date than that at 
which Sonliner wrote, namely till IG>2. Alongside of 
the tripartite division, we have evidence of the dual 
division, according as either widow or children were 
awantirig. 
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The passage of Bede leaves points unsettled. 
('Substantia9 would include more naturally than exclude 
land; and ¡Mill, though sometimes used for descendants 
moro naturally means sons. Possibly the law which was 
subsequently elaborated into the doctrine of 41communio 
bonorum, at one time regulated in Anglian Britain, as 
it certainly did in many places elsewhere, both land 
and goods, and possibly the preference of sons to 
daughters, which was unquestionably made at a late stage 
in land, was once universal. But, be these things as 
they may, this much is certain that in Anglo -Saxon 
Scotland the division of the succession into widow's 
part, bairns part/and dead's part'existed from the 
earliest historic. times, and that it has survived with 
us, though it has died out in England". 
It is exceedingly unfortunate Professor 
Dove Wilson has mentioned no other authority than Bede 
in support of his contention. For this omission forces 
us to conclude that this theory, which he puts forward 
with such confidence, is based only on these words of 
Bede, and an assumption that, because he is of the 
opinion that the Loges Burgorum are in the main Anglo- 
Saxon customs, the rule of tripartite division mentioned 
therein must also be Anglo -Saxon in its origin. 
It is inde(d difficult to understand why Pro- 
-fessor Dove Wilson should so unhesitatingly accept 
those words of Bodo as proof positive that the rule of 
a tripartite division of a deceased's property was in 
force at that early date. In so doing, he appears to 
be at variance with almost every authority. Moreover, 
the/ 
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the passage, in which Bede speak of such a division, 
occurs in a fable of a Northumbrian who rose from the 
dead, and so disposed of his property. Surely a very 
flimsy piece of evidence on which to base a reliable 
theory! No English writer appears to have dared to 
ascribe to their rule of division by reasonable parts 
an antiquity so remote as that of the time of Bede. 
Why then should Professor Dove Wilson go , what might 
älmost be said to be,a step further, and connect the 
Sottish custom of tripartite division with ,imilar 
rule said to be in force in England in the 8th century? 
Holdsworth,in his History of English Law, while admitt- 
-ing the possibility of the rule of tripartite division 
having been in existence at so early a date, says that 
there is no definite connecting link in the Anglo -Saxon 
laws between Bede's date and the 12th century (when 
there is clear evidence of the tripartite division being 
in force) . And he regards Bede's fable as evidence only 
of the vagueness of the limits of testamentary power at 
that early period. 
If the scheme of tripartite division was an Anglo- 
Saxon rule of inheritance, it would be only rational to 
expect to find some traces of this custom in the early 
law of England, which was, in the main Anglo -Saxon in 
its nature. But there does not appear to be any evidence 
of such a custom having been recognised at that time. 
It is true that such vestiges of the laws of inheritance 
as have come down to us from that period are vague and 
incomplete, yet they seem to show quite clearly that the 
rules/ 
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rules which then regulated the disposal of a deceased 
husband's property were quite different from the 
tripartite division. 
In Attonborough' s '' Laws of the Earliest English 
Kings', we find the wife's share of her husband's 
property in the timo of Ethelbort of Kent (600 A.D.) 
stated thus:- "if she bears a living child she shall 
have half the goods left by her husband, if he dies 
first. If she wishes to depart with her children, she 
shall have half the goods. If the husband wishes to 
keep (the children) she shall have a share of the 
goods equal to a child's. If she does not bear a child 
(her) father's relatives shall have her goods and the 
'morning gift'. 
Thorpe in his 'Ancient Laws and Institutions 
of England has the following passage in connection with 
the ceremony of betrothal in the time of Edmund: - 
'Then after that let the bridegroom declare what he 
will grant her, in case she choose his will, and what 
he will grant her, if she live longer than he. If it 
be so agreed, then it is right that she be entitled to 
half the property, and to all if they have children in 
common, except she again choose a husband ". 
In the time of Cnut (1016 -1035) , we find the 
deceased's near kinsmen coming in for a share along 
with the wife and children, though it is not stated 
what proportions of the property fell to these respec- 
tive parties. The doom enacting this scheme of 
division runs thus : - (If a man departs from this life 
intestate/ 
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intestate . . . . his lord shall take no' more from his 
property than his legal heriot. But, according to his 
direction, the property shall be very strictly divided 
among his wife and children and near kinsmen, each 
according to the share which belongs to him: 
This rule has certainly, on the face of it, some 
resemblance to the tripartite division, but at the same 
time, there is nothing to indicate that the shares which 
belonged to the wife and children were thirds of the 
property. 
In none of these early English laws of inheritance 
therefore, does there appear to be any evidence of the 
custom of tripartite division having been recognised. 
Professor Dove Wilson admits in his Article that 
the text of the Leges Burgorum has been so subjected to 
additions and insertions owing to Norman or Feudal 
influences that there is considerable difficulty in un- 
-earthing the original Anglo -Saxon element. How then 
can he state with such certainty that the evidence in 
the Loges Burgorum of a rule of tripartite division in 
Scotland is a law of Anglo -Saxon origins 
He states further that this custom existed widely 
in other Germanic Nations. Brissaud, certainly in his 
Histoire du Droit'Priva, says that in pagan Germany there 
seems to have existed the custom of dividing the move - 
-ables of the deceased into three parts, one third for 
the widow, one third for the children, and one third for 
the dead. The objects which went to make up this last 
third/ 
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third wore burned or entombed with the body so as to be 
of use to the deceased in the life beyond the grave. 
After the conversion of the Germans to Christianity,the 
division into thirds persisted for a long time in many 
places, but the disposal of the share of the dead 
changed. It was employed in pious works, "pro remedio 
animae ", and in time became the share of the Church. 
If it could be accepted as an authentic fact 
that this custom of tripartite division had really been 
in force among the Germans, such evidence would form a 
strong argument for an Anglo -Saxon origin of this custom 
in England and Scotland. But Brissaud apparently makes 
this assertion solely on the authority of Brunner on 
"Der Totenteil in Germanischen Rechten", Zeitschrift 
für Reehtsgesehichte xlx 107 et seq., Which article 
seems to be sufficiently refuted by Rietschel on ''Der 
Totenteil in Germanischen :vechten' , Zeitschrift für 
R,echtsgeschichte ill 297 -309. And Liebermann, in 
"Die Gesetze der Anglesachsen",próbably the most com- 
-plete record of Anglo Saxon laws and customs, makes no 
mention of a division by thirds. Brunner's view more - 
-over seems to be discredited by most authoritative 
writers. 
The Professor of Dutch Civil Law and Private 
International Law at Leyden University, Professor 
E. M. Meyers, (who has kindly given the Writer permis- 
-sion to quote his views on this subject) is emphatically 
of the opinion that the scheme of tripartite division 
of a deceased's estate is not a custom of Germanic origin, 
"The/ 
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"Tho German writers ", he says, "- and Brissaud is a 
follower of the Germans - name all laws, which are 
not of Róman origin, Germañic laws, but this is the 
greatest mistake of the contemporary history of Law ". 
He further states that this mode of division occurs 
in the most scattered parts of Europe, as for instance, 
in Sicily and Bohemia, but that there is no trace of 
it in the real Germanic law, which comprises Skan- 
-dinavian, Saxon, Frisianiand Anglo Saxon law, and 
that to pretend that the Sicilian law, which bows 
this tripartite division, is a Germanic law, is an 
error already refuted by many writers . 
The theory that the English and Scotch systems 
of tripartite division were derived from early French 
law,, however, has no lack of reliable, evidence to 
support it. It seems to be unquestionable that com- 
plete conformity existed between the old Normandian 
customs and the ancient customs in English and Scots 
law on this matter. It is true that Pollock and 
Maitland say they have seen no proof that the rule of 
tripartite division ever prevailed in Normandy. But 
it seems hardly conceivable that any importance can be 
attached to a statement which has such an overwhelming 
weight of evidence against it. 
This theory of a Normandian origin is emphati- 
--calIy contended by 'Professor Meyers, and strongly 
supported by Dr. F. P. Walton, sometime Professor of 
Roman Law at McGill University, Montreal. In a paper 
on "the Relationship of the law of France to the Law 
of/ 
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of Scotland'' read before the International Law Associa- 
_ 
-tion at a Conference held in Glasgow in August 1901 
(which paper was published in the Juridical Review of 
1902 Vol. XIV) the latter says that the jus relictae of 
Scots Law is precisely analogous to the right of a 
French Wife, commune en biens, to her share of the 
eowmunity when the division takes place. 
Le tres Ancien coutumier de Normandie, the Summa 
de Legibus Normannie, Lefebures - "le Droit des Gens 
Mar io ' s Aux Pays de Droit Écrit et de Normandie" 
r J.. 9 " , J It diolet s - Precis de l'Histoire du Droit Franeais 
and L'rissaud's - "l'histoire de Droit 'Privé" are among 
a few of the works that furnish evidence that the 
division by thirds was the ancient Normandian law. 
Brissaud informs us that a surviving Wife received not 
only her dower, but one third or one half of the move - 
-ables left by the husband at his death - one third if 
he had children born during the marriage, one half if 
there were no children alive. Such a mode of division 
is exactly analogous to the division by reasonable parts 
in England, and the tripartite division in Scotland. 
It therefore seems that, of all the conflicting 
and vague theories which have been advanced to account 
for legitim and jus relictae in Scotland, the theory 
that they were introduced first of all into England 
from Normandy, and subsequently into Scotland is the 
only one which, in view of the scanty evidence avail- 




It is not suggested that, at the time of the Con- 
-quest, this rule of tripartite division was imported 
as a piece of Norman legislature and enforced on the 
vanquished English. While it cannot be pretended that 
the Norman Conquest had no effect on the laws of England, 
there seems little doubt that this effect was gradual 
and, indeed, at first almost imperceptible. There was 
no sweeping away of English law and rigid substitution 
and enforcement of Norman law. Freeman, in his "History 
of the Norman Conquest'', thus describes the Norman 
influence on English law : - "Norman ideas, Norman 
principles, if not actual Norman institutions, crept 
in alongside of earlier English ideas, sometimes modi- 
-iying 'the English institutions, sometimes merely 
changing their names Our institutions 
are in no sense of Norman origin, but they bear about 
them the trace of deep and abiding Norman influences. 
The lays of England were never abolished to make room 
for any laws of Normandy: but the laws of England were 
largely modified both in form and spirit by their admin- 
istration at the hands of men, all whose ideas were 
naturally Norman. The change was silent and gradual ". 
We have seen that, before the Norman Conquest 
English law recognised the wife of a deceased as having 
a share in his estate, and, in the case of Cnut's doom 
the children were apparently at that time also entitled 
to some share. The lack of any uniform custom of divid- 
-ing a deceased's estate, the fact that the wife seems 
generally to have been allowed a half of the property, 
and/ , 
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and at some time a share given also to the children, 
would afford a very receptive field for modification 
into the Norman system of the tripartite division. 
Such modification and alteration would, of course, be 
a very gradual process, and there is no definite evi- 
dence to show when it would reach its completion. 
It is equally uncertain at what time this 
tripartite division was introduced into Scotland. 
Professor Goudy, in the lecture already referred to 
propounds the theory that it was introduced at the 
time of the compilation of the Regiarn Majestatem, 
being copied into that work from Glanville. Disagree - 
-ing with the view that legitim had a Roman origin, he 
sayf :- hit seems to me much more 'probable that the 
doctrine of legitim was introduced into Scotland from 
the law of England. For it is a fact that by the old 
customary law of England, (whether derived from the 
Normans about the time of the Conquest or handed down 
from Saxon times is doubtful) a testator, who was sur- 
vived by wife and children, had his powers of bequest 
restricted to one -third of his personality. His widow 
had a right to one -third of his estate, and the chil- 
dren to another third - such share being called in 
each caso the rationabilis pars. So the law is stated 
IN Glanville, and so it existed in the time of 
Littleton From Glanville this rule 
of rationabilis pars was copied into the Regiam 
Ma.jestatem. It is said in both works, Cum quis in 
infirn,itate positus testamentum facere voluerit . . . 
omnes/ 
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omnes res ejus mobiles in tres partes dividentur 
aequales , Ouarum una clebetur haeredi_, secunda uxori, 
tertia reservetur testatori. Accordingly, you see, 
the Scottish doctrine on the subject was virtually 
the same as that of England down to the time of the 
Reformation ". 
But there are objections to this proposition of 
Professor Goudy. For its acceptance we must be entirely 
satisfied that Glanville's book is the original work 
and the Regiam Majestatem, in parts , at any rate, a 
mere slavish copy of it. Although possibly the weight 
of the best informed opinion is in favour of the 
originality of Glanville, we understand that some of 
the most recent researches leave this matter in a state 
of considerable doubt, and that the possibility of the 
Regia,a Majestatem being the original work is by no 
means conclusively disposed of. 
Furthermore the fact that the rule of the 
tripartite division is postulated in the Regiam 
Majestatem does not prove that it was not in use in 
Scotland before the compilation of that work. The 
Legos Burgorum, which there is every reason to believe 
were compiled at an earlier date than the Regiam 
Majestatem, mention the doctrine of legitim (which 
seems inseparably bound up with the rules of the 
rationabilis pars) and declare that it has existed in 
'Scotland beyond the memory of man. Surely such incon- 
-sistencies do not lend much support to Professor 
Goudy's view. 
It seems much more probable that, if this rule 
did/ 
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did not find its way into Southern Scotland by means of 
the English sympathies of the sons of Malcolm Canmore 
(particularly those of Edgar, who owned a species of 
allegiance to William Rufus during the whole of his 
reign) it must almost certainly have crept in not later 
than the time of David 1, and very possibly during his 
reign. For .'David, having spent his youth at the court 
of the Norman King of England, was thoroughly Norman in 
his sympathies and principles. Indeed the Norman 
influence in Scotland was probably at its height during 
his kingship, and, in view of the lack of any positive 
evidence on the question, the theory that the custom of 
the tripartite division of a deceased's estate had 
found its way into Scotland from England not later than 
David's time seems as worthy of consideration as any 
that has yet been offered. 
Various reasons have beenadvanced to account for 
the survivance in Scotland to the present day of the 
rights of jus relictae and legitim, and their desuetude 
in England. 
Some Writers have offered the explanation that 
in England these rights were regarded as inequitable 
restrictions on a married man's power of testing. They 
argued that they would destroy the incentive to save, 
because a man with unduRful children would be desirous 
of disinheriting them, and, if this was prevented by 
the law, he would make no effort to acquire wealth, 
knowing that it would eventually go to those whom he 
did not wish to benefit. There is, however, probably 
only a modicum of fact in this statement. It seems 
more/ 
50. 
more probable that, in England, it was merely the 
natural trend of jurisprudence and the lack of aisy 
supportful influence, that accounted for the dying 
out of the rights of jus relictae and legitim in that 
Country. 
Professor Dove Wilson explains the survivance of 
these-ri ts in Scotland as being due to the care which 
the Canon and the Civil Law ever had for the rights of 
women and children. This explanation seems to be sub- 
-stantially correct, but Professor Goudy, while giving 
a similar view, expresses it more accurately in accord- 
ance with the known facts. The reason for this sur - 
- vivance in Scotland, he says, in his lecture on the 
'Pate of the Ronan Law North and 'South of the Tweed', 
is due to the preponderating influence of the Civil 
Law in that country subsequent to the Reformation. 
"The Scottish lawyers of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries", he points out, "finding that the ration - 
-abilis pars, as regards children harmonized with the 
portlo 7.)gitima of the Roman law, forthwith attributed 
to it a Roman parentage, and supported it by the 
authority of the'Pandects and Code ". 
51. 
The Origin of Terce and Courtesy in Scotland. 
Fewer conflicting theories have been advanced to 
explain the origin in our country of the legal liferents 
of Terce and Courtesy, than in the case of legitim and 
jus relictae. Indeed it is almost universally agreed 
that a Norman origin must be attributed to courtesy, but 
there is not such unanimity of opinion as to the origin 
of Terce. For authorities differ in ascribing to this 
right a Germanic as well as a Norman origin. 
Terce (from tierce partie - third part) must be 
looked for in Scotland first under the name of dower, 
by which name this institution was known in England. 
There is no conclusive evidence to show at what period 
terce was first known in Scotland. Celtic law does not 
appear to have recognised this doctrine, yet there seems 
little doubt that it was observed in this country from an 
age of sufficient antiquity to justify Lord Stair's asser- 
-tion that it was one of those ancient immemorial customs, 
which were the precursors of our legal system. 
The first authentic evidence of the existence of 
dower in Scotland appears -to be furnished by the Regiam 
Mejestatem. It is also expressly recognised at a some - 
-what later date in a Statute of Alexander 11 in 1244. 
There is no mention of it in the lieges Lurgorum, though 
evidence is afforded there of the existence of courtesy 
at that period. This, however, does not seem to imply 
that dower was not known in Scotland as early as courtesy, 
for/ 
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for there seems little doubt that, in England, at any 
rate, dower was the older right. The omission may most 
probably be explained by the fact that terce was not 
due from burgage property, though the widow of a burgess 
had, so long as she remained a widow, a somewhat analo- 
-gous right to the use of the "inwarde parte" of the 
house. 
In spite of the propensity of most of the 
Scottish jurists to as' e a Roman origin civil or 
ecclesiastical to almost every institution in Scots 
Law, they do not appear to have fallen into this error 
in the case of terce. Curiously enough, however, this 
mistake has been made by one of the greatest English 
Jurists. Sir Henry Maine in his "Ancient Law writes:- 
'The provision for the widow was attributable to the 
exertions of the Church ", (i.e. the Roman Church), 
"which never relaxed its solicitude for the interest of 
wives surviving their husbands -- winning, perhaps, one 
of the most arduous of its triumphs when, after exact - 
-ing for two or three centuries an express promise from 
the husband at marriage to endow his wife, it at length 
succeeded in engrafting the principle of dower on the 
customary law of all Western Europe'. But, as we shall 
see, when we look into the origin of dower on the 
Continent,' it seems to have Originally been a civil 
institution, which developed more or less independently 
among the Teutonic races, who settled upon the ruins of 
the Western Empire, and in no way evolved from the 
influence of the Roman Church, nor from any analogous 
doctrine of Roman law. 
As/ 
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As there is evidence of the existence in England, 
at a very much earlier period than the date of the 
Regiam Majestatem, of a right, which, though not called 
dower, was undoubtedly an early form of it, it might be 
contended that dower pr terce found its way into Scot - 
-land via England, although Basnage appears to think 
that, because the Scottish term) wnl at first called 
dower, it was derived directly from the Norman customs. 
But if the former view is to be considered, from what 
source was it introduced into England and at what time? 
Those who favour a Norman origin for dower point 
to the analogous right of the French douaire, which was 
almost exactly similar in every respect to its English 
counterpart. This argument may be substantiated by 
contending that the English word "dower" is derived 
from the French douaire. 
Such a view of the origin of dower places the 
date of its introduction into England at some period 
subsequent to the Norman Conquest. Fraser, who admits 
the great antiquity of this right among the Teutonic 
nations, states that "there is every reason to believe 
that in this country it is coeval with the feudal 
system ". It is not clear whether by, "this country ", 
he includes England or not, but it would appear as if 
he considered the feudal system had some influence on 
the introduction of Terce. Not only is it difficult, 
however, to find any evidence ii support of such a view, 
but the contention that dower was introduced into 
England by the Normans, or direct by the.d into Scotland, 
appears to be quite erroneous. For there is ample 
evidence to show that a right which was certainly the 
earlier/ 
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earlier form of dower existed in England at a date con- 
-siderably prior to the Norman Conquest. 
The Lex Saxonum indeed actually states that the 
7 
custom as to the destination of a wife's dower on her 
death varied with the customs of different districts. 
In one of the laws, which obtained in the reign of King 
Ethelbert, as these are set forth in Attenborough's 
"Laws of the Earliest English Kings ", it is enacted that 
if a wife does .mot bear a child her father's relatives 
shall have her goods and the "morning gift" (the earlier 
name for dower) . A law in the reign of C . .ute , which 
provided that every-widow must not remarry within twelve 
months of her husband's death, stated that, if she chose 
a husband within that.time, she would lose her morning 
gift and all the property which she had from her first 
husband, and his nearest relations would take the land 
and the property which she had held. One of the laws of 
Henry I also provides that a wife who survives her hus- 
-band shall have her dower given to her by written 
instruments. Such evidence as this seems to prove 
clearly that dower was in existence in England in some 
form prior to the Norman influence, and that it must 
therefore have its origin in early Anglo Saxon law. 
'It ' is true that Blackstone says that dower out 
of lands seems to have been unirnown in the early part of 
our Saxon constitution, for, in the laws of King Edmond, 
the wife is directed to be supported wholly out of the 
personal estate. He suggests that it is possible that 
dower, in England, may be a relic of a Danish custom, 
since, according to the historians of that country, dower 
was/ 
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was introduced into 'Denmark by S ein, the father of Canute 
the Groat, out of gratitude to the Danish ladies, who 
sold all their jewels to ransom him when taken prisoner 
by the Vandals. This contention, however, does not seem 
to have much to support it, as there appears to be no 
doubt that dower was recognised in the early Saxon law, 
and the explanation of the origin of dower among the 
Danes savours more of an ancient legend than of an 
authentic fact. 
Glanville held that every man was bound both by 
ecclesiastical and by temporal law to endow his spouse 
at the time of the espousals. He distinguishes between 
two different ways of giving dower. If the husband 
endowed his wife with certain specific lands this was 
known as a dos nominata and rust not exceed one third 
of his lands, but if he named no particular lands, he 
was understood to endow his wife with one third of the 
lands of which he was seised at the time of the 
espousals, and this was known as a dos rationabilis. 
Pollock and Maitland hold that even this dos rationabilis 
can easily be represented as the result of the bridegroomh 
bounty and not as a compulsory provision. They state that 
the origin of dower is attributed by the lawyers to a 
gift made by the bridegroom to the bride at the Church 
door, but they have not discovered any sufficient reason 
for supposing, as Glanville does, that the right is of 
ecclesiastical origin. 
Investigation into the origin of dower on the 
Continent demonstrates quite- clearly that this right 
was evolved in the development of the old Germanic law. 
It/ 
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It is even possible there to trace each step of its 
development. In the most primitive system of law which 
first obtained among the Germanic tribes there was 
scarcely any question of the possessions of the wife. 
It was a system not yet recognising the doctrine of a 
community of goods, in which there existed only one 
inheritance', namely that in the hands of the husband. 
There were, however, three classes of possessions over 
which the wife had claims: the Germanic marriage 
portion, the LMorgengabe", or gift of the morning, and 
the marriage portion in the Roman sense, or share 
brought by the wife. 
It appears that among the primitive Germanic 
tribes , the family organization was similar to that 
which obtained at one time among the Romans. Just 
as under the old Roman law, the wife passed in manu,,,.. 
mariti at her marriage, so in the old Germanic law she 
found herself and her possessions under the mundium 
of her husband. In his book, "Das Recht der 
Eheschliessung in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung", 
Dr Von Emil Friëdberg traces the growth of this mundium 
of the old Germanic tribes into the law of dower, the 
price originally paid by the husband to the relations 
of the wife for her mundium (i.e. the privileges 
arising to him out of the legal guardianship or tutela 
which he acquired over her > This payment was, in 
course of time, secured to the wife as a provision in 
case of widowhood. 
But the law of dower was not evolved solely 
from/ 
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from the payment made by the husband for the mundium 
of the wife. In the primitive law the wife received 
none of this payment. It belonged absolutely to her 
relatives. In this connection it is interesting to 
observe that a very similar marriage law prevailed in 
Babylonia as early as 2285 - 2242 B.C. The Code of 
laws, promulgated by Hammurabi, King of Babylon at that 
period, and said to be the oldest code of laws in the 
world, shows that the husband was required to pay a 
bride price to his father -in -law, the latter giving 
his daughter a marriage portion, which descended to 
the children of the marriage. But, if the wife died 
without children, the husband had to return the 
marriage portion to the father -in -law, first deducting 
from it the bride price, unless this had been repaid. 
With the primitive Germanic tribes the wife received 
from her husband the gift of the morning, and from her 
relativos only a few articles of clothing or ornament. 
The gift of the morning or "morgengabe" con- 
-listed originally in merely a few simple gifts which 
it was customary for the husband to give to the wife 
the day after the marriage. It was in the nature of 
a ratification by him of the marriage, and a renunci- 
-tion of the right to repudiate his wife in cases 
where, according to the biblical expression, she did . 
not find favour before him. 
The share brought by the wife also originally 
consisted only in clothing and ornaments exclusively 
used by women - a more trousseau in fact. Later, 
this developed into a substantial portion. Sometimes 
her parents gave her her share of the inheritance in 
advance/ 
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advance. Sometimes she had already received this 
owing to the previous death of her father and mother. 
This share, which corresponded to the Roman dos, was 
the maritagium of the Anglo Saxons. 
A passage from the Laws of Wessex, attributed 
to Henry 1 of England, shows the wife as being entitl- 
-ed on the death of the husband to these three rights, 
which were then quite separate and distinct. It runs 
thì :- ' "If the wife survive her husband let her have 
permanently her dower and her maritagium given to her 
by written instruments or production of witnesses, and 
her " morgengift" and a third part of all joint 
acquisition besides clothes and her bed, and let her 
receive nothing in respect of what has been consumed 
in charity or common necessity ". 
The purchase price paid by the husband to the 
relatives of the wife came, in time to be paid to the 
wife herself. There was an intermediate stage in 
which the relatives still received a portion of it, 
the rest going to the wife, but ultimately she got 
the whole price as a marriage portion. This provid- 
-ing of a marriage portion came to be a requisite 
condition for the validity of a marriage. Certain 
barbarian laws even established a legal marriage 
portion if none were given by agreement. This custom 
may be explained thus:- On the death of the husband, 
the marriage portion assured better treatment for the 
widow than she might otherwise receive and -ire -±p to 
provide for her maintenance. It also served as an 
equitable compensation for the benefit gained by the 
husband under a system where the wife's possessions 
became/ 
became merged in a community of property under the 
husband's administration. The husband appropriated 
for his wife a portion 
. 
of his estate in return for 
what he gained over her possessions, or with their 
assistance. The obligation to pay a marriage portion 
would become stronger as the wife's rights of inheri- 
tance assumed importance,and a portion of the acquests 
had also to be given to her. It is probable that 
originally the marriage portion consisted in only 
moveable objects, but later it came to include heritage 
also. 
The gift of the morning underwent a similar 
development. In the christian reaction against the 
earlier facility of divorce, it lost its original 
reason for existing, and was changed into something 
which corresponded to the Germanic marriage portion. 
Like the latter it came to include both moveables and 
immoveables, and not mere objects for the use of women. 
It is not difficult to understand that it eventually 
became merged with the marriage portion, and together 
with it developed into the later institution of dower. 
It seems clear that the component parts of 
dower were brought to both Scotland and England by the 
Anglo Saxon tribes, as there is ample evidence of their 
existence in England before the Norman influences were 
felt, and that they underwent a similar fusion here to 
what took place on the Continent. The morning g'ft, 
however, appears to have retained its separate entity 
s 
to a comparatively late date in this country, and to 
have been given at the door of the Church along with 
the dower. With the advent of Christianity dower at 
once/ 
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.once assumed a religious significance, and it became 
the universal practice to endow the wife at the Church 
door. This came to be looked upon almost as part of 
the religious ceremony necessary to constitute a 
marriage, and doubtless gave rise to the view hold by 
some that dower had an ecclesiastical origin. Fraser 
is of opinion that only a wife married in Church was 
entitled to dower, but this is not clear. A Statute 
of Alexander ll enacts that, for her dowrie sehe 
shall have the third of all the lands quhilk perteined 
to hir husband in his lifetime, gif sehe received na 
dowrie at the kirk dure quhen sehe was married ". While 
this Statute apparently does not contemplate the wife 
being married other than in Church, it is probably 
going rather far to say that a wife not so married cann- 
-ot get dower, as this Statute expressly provides dower 
for a wife who has not previously received it. 
While it is possible to trace the gradual 
growth of dower on the Continent, it is most difficult 
to discover how it came to apply exclusively to heri- 
table property, there being no doubt that it once 
comprehended moveables also. It is possible that 
when more modern jurisprudence began to classify pro- 
perty into moveables and immoveables, and the widow's 
jus relictae came to be restricted to the former, 
dower was made to apply only to the latter. It might 
also be suggested that, as dower developed into a 
liferent, it would have been difficult to allow it 
from moveables without the constitution of some kind 
of trust to safeguard the capital of the fund so 
appropriated. 
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Although some writers maintain that COURTESY 
obtained among the Germanic tribes as well as with the 
Normans and other peoples of France, there does not 
seem to be any trace of it having been recognised in 
this country, or in England at a date prior to the 
Norman Conquest. This naturally leads to the infer - 
-ence that it was introduced into Britain by the 
Normans, and there seems to be no reason to cast any 
doubts on this theory. 
The first evidence of the existence of courtesy 
in- Scotland, though it is not called such, seems to be 
furnished by the Leges Burgor um L.41, which runs thus:- 
"De burgagio collato in liberum maritagium - Si 
aliquis acceperit burgagium can aliqua in liberum 
maritagium et cum ea genuerit masculum vel feminam et 
casu contingente moriatur uxor viri illius et post 
mortem matris si filius vel filia vivat vel moriatur 
vir illo burgagio omnibus diebus vite sue gaudebit sed 
illud ultra nec vendere nee i.mpignorare potest. Et 
si illa nocte qua wascitur filius vel filia simul 
moriatur mater et filius vel filia adhuc vir gaudebit 
bonis illius terre in vita sua ita tarnen quod vir 111e 
habeat testimonium du.orum legalium virorum vel mulierum 
vicinarurn qui audierunt infantem clamantem vel plorantem 
vel braiantem. Et sic si plures terras acceperit in 
maritagium cum uxore sua. Si vero prolem non genuerit 
dicta terra revertetur ad proximos heredes uxoris sue'. 
"Skene and Stair were apparently under the mis- 
-apprehension that courtesy was a right which was Down 




equal ignorance in stating that it was peculiar to 
'England. Fraser recognises that it was borrowed from 
the Continent, where it was early matured, and indeed 
formed one of the rules of the continental jurispru- 
-dence. He appears to be less correct, however, when 
he states that the language of the coutume of Normandy 
is the same as that of Scotland. For the Norman 
custom allows courtesy to the husband only so long as 
he shall remain a widower. Hale, in his History of 
the Common Law of England, notices this distinction 
in regard to courtesy in his own country. He says: - 
"Also in some things tho' both the law of Normandy 
and the law of England agrer;d in the fact and in the 
manner of proceeding, yet there was an apparent 
discrimination in their law from ours: as for instance 
the husband seized in right of the wife, having issue 
by her, and she dying, by the custom of Normandy he 
held but only during his widowhood, Coutume cap.119. 
But in England, he held during his life by the courtesy 
of England: 
Stair and Bankton were of the opinion that the 
origin of courtesy in our law was to be found in the 
constitution of the Emporor Constantine. which enacted 
that property descending from the mother, whether by 
her testament, or by law, should devolve to the sons, 
but that the father should use and enjoy it all the 
days of his life; the property, however, still per - 
-taining to the children. Lord 'Pitfour was also of 
this opinion. Craig, while he refers to this con- 
stitution as being, perhaps the ground-work of the 
law in those continental states which were subjected 
to/ 
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to the Roman power, claims no higher antiquity for this 
institution in Scots law than the Norman customs which 
were adopted both in England and in this country. But, 
as Fraser points out, the general enactment of the 
Roman law does not even allude to the many peculiar 
rules governing courtesy. Most of these, however, are 
to be found in the laws of various States on the Con- 
-tinent, which recognised courtesy long before any 
settled law on the subject can be claimed for this 
country. It would therefore rather appear that this 
endeavour to trace the origin of courtesy to the law 
of Rome is simply another example of the too exclusive 
references to Roman law which were almost invariably 
made by our earlier jurists when seeking to discover 
the origin of our legal doctrines. 
Basnage states the language of the coutume of 
Normandy in regard to courtesy thus: - "Homme avant 
un enfant né vif de sa femme jouit par usufruit, tant 
qu'il se tient en viduité de tout le revenu appartenant 
a sa dite femme lors de son deces, encors que l'enfant 
soit mort avant la dissolution du mariage". With the 
exception that in Normandy the husband was entitled to 
courtesy only so long as he remained a widower, this 
statement, of the law on this subject is the same as it 
was in both Scotland and England. This writer, however, 
goes on to account for this right in Normandy by saying 
'"Cet usufruit lui étant donne comme une recompense 
d'avoir donne des sujets a la Republique en procréant 
des enfans ". Brissaud, on the other hand, says that, 
following the example of the Barbarian law, the usages 
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of certain provinces, such as Normandy, Anjou and Maine, 
made an exception to the common law and allowed the 
widower the marriage portion of the wife; and that this 
same custom existed across the channel under the name of 
"curtesy of England'. A similar institution, he says 
prevailed in the countries of written law under the 
name of the "counter- increase ". 
If Brissaud be correct, it would appear that 
courtesy is not of such great antiquity as dower, and 
that it originated on the continent as a set -off against 
dower, which came to be allowed to the husband: Such an 
explanation of the origin of courtesy takes no cognis- 
ance of the condition that a live child must be born 
of the marriage in order to entitle the husband to this 
right, but it is quite possible that this requirement 
did not adhere to courtesy in its original form, and 
simply became grafted to it by force of custom. 
According to Brissaud, it would appear that this 
right had existed in some form among the primitive 
barbarian tribes on the continent and been copied from 
them by certain of the Franch provinces. This would 
accord with the views of those writers who contend that 
it existed among the early Germanic tribes. There does 
not, however, seem to be any evidence of it having been 
introduced into Britain by any of these tribes even in 
an incomplete state of its development, as dower was. 
The first evidence of the existence of courtesy both in 
England and in Scotland shows us that this right 
appeared in a form almost as complete and fully 
developed/ 
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developed as that in which it exists today. The fact 
that its existence cannot be traced in Britain before 
the Norman Conquest, and the fact that it existed in 
Normandy from the earliest times, in an almost exact - 
-ly similar form to that in which it first appeared 
in this country, seems to point fairly conclusively 
to our having adopted it from that country. It is 
difficult to say whether courtesy was introduced 
direct into Scotland through the Norman influence on 
the Leges Burgorum, or whether it came into this 
country via England, but, as it appears to have been 
in existence in Scotland at as early a date as it was 
in England, it seems probable that the former theory 
is the correct one. 
It seems most likely that originally courtesy 
was exigible both from heritage and moveables. If 
it owes its origin to the husband being allowed the 
marriage portion of the wife, this would certainly 
be the case, as the marriage portion often consisted 
of both. As in the case of dower, it is difficult to 
discover when this right was restricted to heritage 
only. Possibly this change occurred about the same 
time as it did with dower, and for similar reasons. 
66. 
1V. 
The Nature of Jus Relictae and ,Legitim. 
The exact nature of jus relictae and legitim 
appears to have aroused as much controversy as the 
question of their origin. Doubtless this is to a great 
extent due to the very obscurity surrounding the latter 
question, but the alterations made by various statutes 
in certain important particulars of these rights must 
boar some share of the responsibility. Three distinct 
theories have been advanced to explain the nature of 
these rights. They have been described as rights of 
succession, as debts against the husband's and father's 
executry, and as rights of division of a common stock 
of property held in partnership by the husband, wife, 
and children of the marriage. 
The theory that jus relictae and legitim are 
rights of succession does not appear to have much con- 
structive evidence to support it It appears to have 
been evolved as the result of diligent searches after 
every possible objection which could be made against the 
other two theories. Bell, in his Principles, Soc. 1582, 
say's, "Legitim, which is generally stated as a share of 
the goods in communion belonging to the children on 
dissolution of the marriage, is more correctly a right of 
succession to a share of the father's moveable estate - -", 
but he does not, unfortunately, explain why it is more 
correct to regard legitim as a right of succession than 
as a right of division of common property. 
In the Journal of Jurisprudence for 1859,Volume 
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111 there appears on page 72 an article on the nature 
of Legitim and jus relictae, in which the theory of 
their being rights of succession is supported. But 
here again the only arguments, which seem to be 
advanced in support of this contention, are the ob,joe- 
-tions to the theories that legitim and jus relictae 
are debts, or rights of division. 
The Writer of this article cites the case of 
Shearer V Christie 1842, 5 D 132 as repudiating the 
latter theory. In this case, Lord Mackenzie, in 
expressing the opinion of the majority of the Court, 
said, "The wife's original property in it" (her 
moveable estate before marriage) "had been extinguished 
by the marriage, by which it became the property of the 
husband, just as much as his own moveable property was. 
Both, no doubt, fell under the name of communio bonorum. 
But we cannot regard that as giving to the wife any 
right of property during the subsistence of the 
marriage. The absolute power of use and disposal 
being in the husband, we must consider the goods 
nominally in communion as truly his, not at all the 
wife's property. In this view, we do not think that 
a mere renunciation of the jus mariti made by the 
husband, in relation to the whole or any part of these 
goods, could vest the property of them in the wife ". 
Ho then refers to the case of Fisher V Dixon 
1843, 2 Bell's Ap. 63, which he considers decides 
conclusively that legitim and jus relictae are not 
rights of division of common property. Apparently he 
also believes that this case supports his theory that 
they/ 
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they are rights of succession, for he declares Fraser's 
interpretation of this case, as holding that legitim 
and ,jus relictae are debts against the executry, to 
be erroneous. 
Against the theory that these rights are debts, 
he points out that all the authorities speak of them 
as shares of the deceased's.property and. that, in the 
most recent cases the Judges speak of the right of the 
children during the father's life as a spec successionis 
But, strongest argument of all, the theory that these 
rights are mere debts to be deducted from the executry 
is quite inconsistent with the acknowledged principle 
that a general settlement is incompatible with a claim 
for legitim, so that a child cannot both take under 
the former and claim the latter. 
The Writer then refers to the passage in Bell's 
`Principles already quoted, and that concludes his case 
for the theory that legitim and jus relictae are rights 
of succession. He offers no constructive evidence in 
support of this theory, but apparently arrives at it 
simply by endeavouring to dispose of the other two 
theories as being impracticable. 
In the second last paragraph of the article, 
it is observed that, "Though jus relictae and legitim 
are rights of succession, they do not come under the 
terms of Mr. Dunlop's Act (18 Viet. C. 23) which intro- 
duces the doctrine of representation in cases of 
intestate moveable succession ". The Writer explains 
this by saying that no person can die intestate quoad 
jus relictae and legitim. It would not be very 
difficult/ 
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difficult to find in the exception of these rights 
from this Act an argument against the theory that 
they are rights of succession. 
In this connection it is interesting to notice 
Bankton's theory as to why there is no representation 
in regard to legitim. He says that, as it was a fre- 
-quent custom for fathers to advance their children 
sums of money towards satisfaction of their legitim, 
it was necessary that there should be some way.of 
proving this when the claim was made. In the case of 
children, such payments could be proved by putting 
the children on oath, but, if grandchildren were to be 
allowed to claim legitim, there would be no way of 
proving whether their parents had received sums in 
satisfaction of it or not. 
Although rather in the nature of another 
digression it is also of interest to note that 
Dunlop's'Act removed the restriction which denied a 
widow her jus relictae, unless the marriage had sub- 
-sisted for a year and day, or a living child had 
been born of it. For this restriction can trace 
its origin to a very ancient custom which seems to 
have prevailed at one time among the early Germanic 
tribes. It appears that spouses were not considered 
to be properly married until the marriage had sub - 
-sisted for a year and day, or a living child been 
born of it. If there was no child, presumably either 
party could dissolve the marriage within the period 
mentioned without any of the usual consequences of 
such an event, as the then existing marriage seems to 
have/ 
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have been recognised, only as a sort of trial marriage 
or probe - ehe, as the German Writers call it. Might 
not our présent divorce law find in this ancient 
custom an inspiration for its amelioration? 
Apart, however, from the fact that the theory 
that jus relictae and legitim are rights of succession 
has no constructive evidence to support it, there are 
such serious objections to it that it can obviously 
be proved to be untenable. Two of these objections 
it seems appropriate to bring forward now. The third 
may be more fitly considered when the theory that ius 
relictae and legitim are rights of division is dealt 
with. 
Professor Walton, in the address referred to 
earlier in this treatise, points out that jus relictae 
and legitim are not rights of succession because, in 
the first place, they are indefeasible and override 
any contrary disposition by Will, and, in the second 
place, jus relictae could at one time be claimed by 
the wife's representatives if she predeceased her 
husband. Now, no man can be called on to divide his 
succession during his lifetime, so it is obvious that 
if jus relictae is a mere right of succession, the 
wife's representatives could have had no claim so long 
the husband was alive, nor, if this were the case, 
could a wife claim jus relictae on divorce. There is 
no getting round this fact, which, of itself, would seem 
sufficient to prove that jus relictae, at any rate, is 
something more than a right of succession. 
The theory that jus relictae and legitim are 
debts against the executry has been vigorously pro- 
- pounded/ 
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- pounded by Fraser in his book on the "Law of the 
Personal and Domestic Relations ", and the more recent 
cases dealing with these rights seem disposed to 
regard them in that light, if they do not actually 
enunciate this doctrine. 
In volume 1 of this book pages 528 -531, 
Fraser deals shortly with the conflicting views as 
to the nature of jus relictae and legitim, which 
have been put forward by different writers and 
expressed in various cases. He then interprets the 
case of Fisher V. . Dixon as holding that these rights 
are nothing more than debts against the executry, 
and seems to consider that the dictum, which he 
attributes to this case,has settled this long dis- 
-puted question once and for all. Referring to it, 
he says:- "The view which the Court took of jus 
reiictae and of legitim sanctioned neither of the 
prevailing opinions that they were rights of division 
or rights of succession; but, adopting a different 
principle, a conclusion was arrived at, which seems 
incompatible with either of these doctrines. They 
held that the father, during his life, had entire 
power over the whole moveable property to be divided; 
that he could convey all this property to a trustee, 
and that the rights of the widow and the children 
were nothing different from those of ordinary credi- 
tors against their debtor; that the jw relictao 
and legitim were debts against the executry funds 
like ordinary debts, and, in short, were nothing 
more than mere claims, competent to the parties in 
right of them, against the husband's executor. The 
recognition/ 
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recognition of such a principle fixes the law upon this 
subject upon a basis at once clear and definite ". 
It cannot be disputed that, on the husband's 
death, jus relictae and legitim are claims for sums 
of money which must be satisfied by the executor. 
But they are not debts against the executry in the 
ordinary sense, for they cannot compete with the 
claims of ordinary creditors: nor do the Judges in 
this case appear to have said so. The view taken by 
Fraser appears to be little short of amazing in a 
man of such eminence. In the first place he undoubt- 
-edly seems to have infused a meaning into the views 
expressed by the Judges in Fisher V Dixon which was 
not intended. In the second place, as a legal writer 
and historian, he ought to have realised that the 
nature of rights, which are fundamental principles 
of our law, cannot be laid down beyond further argu- 
-ment and investigation simply by a judicial decision. 
The origin and antiquity in Scots law of legitim and 
jus relictae had, at that time, nover been fully 
investigated. Without a better knowledge of their 
origin, it was obviously foolish to lay down hard and 
fast rules as to their nature. And, in the third 
place, this theory, even supposing it to be partially 
correct, is obviously incomplete. For, if jus 
relictae and legitim are mere debts and nothing more, 
what is the ground of debt? And if, as Fraser also 
states, the husband is absolute owner of the property 
during the marriage, how can his wife and children 
have claims on it at his death? Without a satisfactory 
explanation/ 
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exPianation of these points Fraser's theory does not 
merit serious consideration. 
There is thus left the theory that jus relictae 
and legitim are rights of division of a common fund 
and careful research seems to demonstrate that, in 
spite of the many objections which have been made 
against it, this theory is the true, explanation of 
the nature of these rights. The great weight of 
opinion which has arisen against this theory seems to 
bo accounted for by a lack of information in regard 
to the origin of these rights, the effect on them of 
Statutes anddecisions, and an inability to properly 
comprehend the doctrine of communio bonorum, with 
which this theory is bound up. The first and third 
of these factors seem, in their turn, to have been 
occasioned by a lack of research into the principles 
of ancient law. 
There seems little doubt that the apparent 
unsatisfactoriness of the doctrine of a communion of 
goods between spouses in Scotland has proved the main 
stumbling block to the acceptance of the theory that 
jus relictae and legitim are rights of division. 
Fraser goes very fully into this subject in Volume 1 
of his book on the personal and domestic relations. 
He argues that the theory of a communie bonorum, as 
our older writers call it, was of late introduction 
into our law, and that the name was borrowed by our 
lawyers from France in the 17th century. He main- 
-tains that it is inconsistent to speak of a fund as 
common/ 
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common property and yet admit that one partner - the 
husband can do as he likes with it. But, as Professor 
Walton points out, the chapter on communio bonorum is 
most unconvincing. For, not only does Fraser fail to 
prove that in Stair's time, any change was made in the 
substance, as opposed to the terminology of our law on 
this question, but he has obviously failed to under- 
-stand how this doctrine of a community of goods oper- 
-ated in its earliest stages. Had he understood it, 
he would have found no insuperable inconsistency in the 
husband's extensive powers over the common fund. 
But, even if were to acceót Fraser's con - 
-tention that the doctrine of communio bonorum formed 
no part of our ancient law, and was not introduced into 
Scotland till the 17th century, such a state of affairs 
would be no proof that Sus relictae and legitim are 
not rights of division. If Fraser had been able to 
show that they had no place in our ancient law, but 
had come into being as a result of the introduction of 
this community doctrine his contention might be less 
absurd. Jus Relictae and Legitim, however, were 
recognised in our earliest law and are most obviously 
not the result of the perhaps comparatively modern 
Scottish doctrine of community of goods, but of a far 
older community, which had its birth on the Continent. 
It is really astonishing that at the present 
clay Fraser's views on this question of a community of 
goods in Scotland have been regarded as of such 
authority. His statement in regard to the existence of 
,/ 
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a community in England is, though brief, equally 
inaccurate. He says, without any qualification, that 
the law of England recognises no communio bonorum, 
even in name. With this rather sweeping assertion, 
it is interesting to compare Pollock and Maitland's 
more carefully considered and more accurate statement. 
"We are not contending; they say, "that the law of 
England ever did definitely recognise a community 
of goods betwet,n husband and wife. We have, however, 
seen many rules as to what takes place on the dissol- 
ution of marriage, which might easily have been 
explained as the outcome of such a community, had our 
temporal lawyers been free to consider and administer 
them. Unfortunately about the year 1200 they suffered 
the ecclesiastical courts to drive a wedge into the 
law of husband and wife, which split it in twain. The 
lay lawyer had thenceforth no immediate concern with 
what would happen on the dissolution of the marriage. 
He had merely to look at the state of things that 
existed during the marriage. Looking at this, he saw 
only the husband's absolute power to deal with the 
chattels inter vivos. Had he been compelled to medi- 
-tate upon the fate which would befall this mass of 
goods as soon as one of the spouses died, he might 
have come to a conclusion which his foreign brethern 
accepted, namely, that the existence of a community 
is by no means disproved by the absolute power of the 
husband who is, so long as the marriage endures, the 
head of the community. As it was, he saw only the 
present, not the future, the present unity of the mass, 
not its future divisions into shares. And so he con - 
-eluded boldly that the whole mass belonged to the 
husband ". 
7s. 
These Writers conclude this passage by saying 
that they consider that Fraser's views on the question 
of a community of goods in Scotland are quite erroneous, 
Dealing with the system of the tripartite division 
of a man's estate, which at one time obtained also in 
England, Pollock and Maitland say, "Ithintimately 
connected with a law of husband and wife which is apt 
to issue in the doctrine that husband and wife have 
their goods in common. All Europe over the new power 
of testation had to come to terms with the ancient 
rights of the wife, the children and the other kins- 
-f o lk" . 
In England , as in Scotland, however, even proof 
positive of the non existence of a community of goods 
between husband and wife, does not establish the fact 
that those rights, which today we call ,jus relictae and 
legitim, were not rights of division of some common 
fund. It is necessary to look to the countries where 
these rights had their origin, in order to discover 
reliable information as to their nature. Although 
there is no evidence of the prevalence of the tripartite 
division of a husband's estate in the old German laws, 
the wife and children undoubtedly had rights on his 
death similar to those under the system of the tripar- 
-tite division, which obtained in Normandy, and other 
parts of France. Thus in order to establish the 
theory that )us relictae and legitim are rights of 
division of a common fund, it is necessary to demon- 
-strate the existence of a community of goods between 
husband and wife on the Continent. 
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Fraser, who goes into this matter also, seems 
again to have fallen into the error of making sweeping 
and rather inaccurate statements. He says that there 
was a proper communion of goods among the Germans,under 
which each of the spouses had equal rights in the 
common fund, that this was borrowed by the French cus- 
-toms towards the end of the 9th and the beginning of 
the 10th centuries, but that these customs and all the 
laws which followed them (as our own) were based on 
principles essentially different. The husband had abso- 
lute ownership and control of the property during 
marriage,'and the French customs simply copied the name, 
but not the substance, of a communion of goods from the 
Germans. The Wife was only the creditor of her husband 
for a share of the goods acquired during the marriage. 
Her right was just a share given gratuitously by the 
tacit consent of the husband and this, Fraser holds, is 
the true explanation of our jus relictae! 
Now this statement about the German community 
appears to be far from correct. A. community in which 
both spouses had equal rights is not only inconsistent 
with the known principles of ancient law, but is quite 
incompatible the doctrine of the German mundium. It is 
quite true that the German community of goods eventually 
justified its name to a great extent, although the right 
of administration was always in the husband. But 
Brissaud and. other continental writers show that, in its 
first stages, the German community afforded no rights to 
the wife during her lifetime. This doubtless was partly 
due to her being able to contribute very little property 
of her own. 
78. 
Fraser goes on to say that there was unquestiori- 
-ably nover any communion of goods between spouses in 
Normandy. In support of this contention he cites the 
389th article of the Coutume de Normandie: "Les 
personnes conjointes par marriage ne sont communs en 
biens, soient meubles ou conquets immeubles; ains les 
femmes n'y oit rien qu' apres la mort du mari ". In 
this passage, we get a glimpse of the same argument 
that community cannot exist because the wife had no 
rights during her husband's lifetime. 
Brissaud also holds the view that there was no 
community in Normandy. Not only did the custom of 
Normandy not admit of any community, he says, but it 
forbade community to be stipulated for. The wife had 
no rights' even in the acquests of the marriage during 
her husband's lifetime. 
But neither Fraser nor Brissaud appears to have 
gone very deeply into this matter. The former adduces 
old charters as evidence of the German community, but 
he has obviously overlooked the old Norman charters. 
The latter offers no evidence in support of his con- 
-tention except the passage in the custom refusing to 
recognise any community. 
Now, it has by no means been proved that a 
community of goods between spouses did not exist at 
one time in Normandy. In fact, the weight of reliable 
evidence seems rather to support the 'existence of such 
a community. 
In 1770 the contention that a community did at 
one/ 
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one time obtain in Normandy was well argued by Du 
Castel in a small book entitled "Dissertation sur la 
Communauté Normande. His assertions, however, were 
followed by an official contradiction from the whole 
bar of the Parliament of Normandy, which reads as 
follows : - 
Arrête 
De L'ordre de Messieurs les Avocats au Parlement de 
Normandie 
du xl d'Aout 1770 
Sur le ranort cui a été fait à la com "a,gnie 
d'un -Lyre intitulÇ: °D sse "cation sur la Comminante 
Normande, imprima á Rouen chez Pierre Seyer, contenant 
14) Pages, il a été arr ' a unanimement que c'est 
s'élever directement contre les dispositions de la 
, que pro tendre qu'il y , 
doive y avoir entre mari & femme une communante en 
cette' Province; qu'au contraire il est de principe 
crue l'article 389 de la coutume est exclusif de comm- 
-unante': comme aussi qu'il est de notoriete qu'il y a 
une distinction certaine L Taire entre les statuts 
personnels & les statuts réels, & que celui qui 
regle la ma.iorite en cite Province est pur personnel 
& suit la personne dans quelques lieux que les biens 
soient situés. Arrêta en outre que le present sera 
imprime & envoye aux Latonniers de l'ordre des 
Avocats de Paris & de Rennes & aux Syldics des 
Collé ̂es de la Province 
(Signe), Mc Jansse Syndic. 
Trie Lalouette, Secr e tait e" . 
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Here again the same article of the custom is by 
itself held to provide conclusive proof that no commun- 
-ity of goods between husband and wife ever prevailed 
in Normandy. But it must be observed that this arréte 
a 
is only -e e that since the compilation of the 
Grand coutumier de Normandie in 1583 no community of 
goods prevailed. It has no authority whatever in 
regard to the early law of Normandy. 
Lefebure, in "Le Droit des Gens Mariés aux 
Pays de Droit Écrit et de Normandie ", also argues 
against contention of a Norman community, but he 
recognises that some of the old Norman Charters furnish 
evidence in support of a community. Unfortunately he 
does not consider these very fully. 
Professor Meyers , however, presents a very 
strong case in support of a community having at one 
time prevailed in Normandy. Le très Ancien Coutumier 
de Normandie, he says, speaks in C. 5 de communi 
catallo. The old Style de Procédure, printed in the 
edtdons of the ancient custom of Normandy of 1534, and 
other Gothic editions, says, in the chapter dealing 
with testaments, that if a father has emancipated his 
children, he can bequeath a half of the goods. This 
would appear to furnish evidence that the emancipation 
of children in Normandy, as in many other countries, 
was a separation of the children from the family pro- 
-perty, so that after this the husband and wife remained 
as the only owners for a half each. The gloss on the 
Summa de Legibus C. 21 says that if a husband forfeits 
all his goods , there remains to the wife and children 
their one third portions, such an enactment cannot be 
a/ 
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a consequence of the law of inheritance. The 
Etablissement de Pont de l'Arche of 1219 allowed a 
wife to make a will ad Dias causas for her part in 
the community. 
The Ancient Charters of Normandy, Professor 
Meyers contends, furnish a considerable amount of 
evidence to show that husband and wife were joint 
owners of acquests, and that a community existed 
between them. The Cartulaire de l'Eglise de la 
Sainte - Trinité de Beaumont - Le - Roger of 1268 in 
narrating a gift between husband and wife, contains 
the following passage : - "Dedimus eciam eidem prioratui 
omnia bona nostra mobilia Post decessu.m nostrum, de 
quibus non licebit nobis aliter disponere vel testari. 
Ex altero nostrum deceden.te prior , qui pro tempere 
fuerit, portionem mobilium decedent's sine contradiction( 
supervenientis (Sic) percipiet et habebit In the 
'Atirements et Jugies d'Eschequiers' also, the word 
"Comriunante" is used in connection with conjugal pro - 
-perty. 
Professor Walton, in his address to the Inter- 
-national Law Association in 1901, in speaking of the 
coutumes of France, says that they were not separate 
bodies of law, that the central doctrine common to all 
was that of la communan-a. Certainly each custom 
varied as to what property fell into this communion, 
as to what were the shares of the partners at its 
dissolution, and as to what proportion of the communion 
the husband could dispose of by Will.. This doctrine 
of a community of goods be Lween spouses was recognised 
not only all over France and Germany, but in such 
scattered/ 
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scattered parts of Europe as Sicily and Bohemia. It 
is very doubtful if, as Fraser asserts, the French 
community was borrowed from Germany, its antiquity 
being probably as great as the community of the latter 
country. There is certainly evidence in the matri- 
-monial system of the Gauls of a species of community 
between husband and wife having prevailed, though the 
common fund went to the survivor in its entirety and 
was not divided on the husband's death. Most of the 
French customs unquestioningly accept the doctrine of 
a community, as, for instance, those of Britanny and 
Amiens, and it seems most improbable that Normandy 
could have escaped this prevailing and fundamental 
doctrine, especially in view of the evidence to the 
contrary. It would rather appear that the compilers 
of the 389th article of the Coutume Normandie had 
fallen into the same short -sighted error as Pollock 
and Maitland attribute to the civil lawyers of England 
after the 13th century, namely, that they had become 
so obsessed with the husband's powers over the con- 
jugal property in his lifetime, that they lost sight 
of the rules governing its division on his death, and 
concluded that there was no community, and that the 
husband was the sole owner. 
The most recent researches into ancient law 
shows that among all the early Aryan nations there 
was no such thing as individual ownership of property. 
It was owned in the first place by the tribe or 
village community, and the individuals who composed 
these groups were simply joint owners of the whole. 
. In some cases they were scarcely even that, for the 
com,Aon/ 
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common property was sometimes practically under the 
ownership of a smaller group consisting of the most 
influential men of the tribe or the community, so 
that the other members were almost in the position 
of tenants rather than joint owners. Later the 
family became a legal unit in which ownership of 
property was recognised. In this case, however, 
probably owing to the rudeness of the age, the wife 
and children were not permitted to share in the con - 
-trol of the joint property. The father, or, where 
all lived together, the grandfather in some eases, 
acquired the property for his household, and, as 
head of the house, possessed it as the manager of an 
implied partnership. As distinct from the patria 
potestas, the basis of the French system of family 
law was not the rights of the father but the interests 
of the wife and children. Moreover unlike the Roman 
system there was no religious significance attached 
to the father's supremacy. His authority was purely 
a civil institution. Originally it was devised for 
the direction and support of the wife and children 
as the weaker members of the family. Later it was 
justified by the theory that, if the wife had equal 
powers-in the partnership with the husband, this 
would lead to endless quarrels, and that in a con- 
. 
-jugal partnership one partner must be empowered to 
enforce his will, and so put an end disputes. It 
can thus be seen that there is no real inconsistency 
between the conception of a partnership,between 
spouses and children, and the husband's complete 
power over the joint property. 
It/ 
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It further appears to be indubitable that the 
origin of all succession among most of the peoples of 
Northern Europe is not descent, but co- ownership. This 
fact, which entirely overthrows the theory that jus 
relictLo and legitim are rights of succession, seems to 
have been frequently lost sight of owing to too fre- 
-quent and exclusive references to Roman law, and a 
lack of investigation into any other earlier ,jurispru- 
-dernee than that which prevailed in feudal times. The 
Roman haeres, and the feudal heir seem to have blinded 
jurists to the fact that in countries in which the 
technical unity of the family was not continued after 
the father's death, the succession was manifestly 
equivalent to survivorship among joint tenants. The 
idea of a succession opening does not appear to have 
occurred to the Northern mind in the more primitive 
stages of its jurisprudence. Widow, children, and 
executors took possession of a deceased's property. as 
owners, not as representatives of the deceased. It is 
easy to see how the later doctrine of communio bonorum 
was evolved from this system. 
This conjugal partnership did not always begin 
at marriage. In our old law it began at the end of 
a year and a day after the marriage, or on the birth 
of a live child, whichever event happened first. This 
rule obtained also in some of the French customs and 
generally among the Germanic tribes. The children of 
the marriage were admitted at birth into the partner- 
-ship, so that each new birth diminished the shares of 
the others pro tanto, just as each child which became 
forisfamiliated increased the shares of those who still 
remained in the partnership. 
SJ . 
Misled by what happened in the development of the 
Roman law, many writers appear to think that the inde- 
-feasible portions of the wife and children were intro - 
-duced by legislation, or the growth of custom, to 
safeguard them against an unrestricted power of testing 
acquired by the father as pater familias. They appear 
to believe that, as in Rome, there was an intermediate 
stage between the primitive period in which members of 
the family took the property of the deceased by virtue 
of survivorship and the period in which the creation of 
the rights of the widow and children took place - a 
stage where the father had a complete power of testing 
in regard to the whole property. But such a view is 
clearly erroneous. The indefeasible portions of the 
wife and children are obviously the result of a period 
when testation was unknown. They were not created as 
restrictions on a complete power of testing. 
It seems clear that, among the Northern nations, 
testation was an innovation of the Church to benefit the 
deceased beyond the grave and itself on this side of it. 
For the earliest Wills almost invariably bequeathed 
property to none but the Church. Indeed it se, ms likely 
that the Church was also responsible for the origination 
of private ownership of property, as obviously such a 
preliminary step was necessary before a man could have 
any power of testation. At the same time, there seems 
little doubt that this new power of testing was not 
extended beyond the dead's part, as being the husband's 
share of the common property and, whatever his powers 
during his lifetime, the only portion he could dispose 
of/ 
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of mortis causa. This is doubtless the explanation 
why a wife and children cannot both take under the 
husband's and father's Will and claim their legal 
rights. The husband is supposed to have the power of 
testing only in regard to the dead's part - his own 
share of the common property, but, if he tests with 
the whole property, he is supposed to be taking into 
account the indefeasible portions of the wife and 
children and adding to these a share of the dead's 
part when he fixes the bequests to them in his Will.. 
These indefeasible shares of the common 
property would necessarily originally be composed of 
both heritage and moveables. It seems most probable 
that the influence of the feudal system on heritage 
was responsible for restricting them to moveable 
property only. Mames argues that legitim became 
altered from a right 'in property into a mere personal 
right , a contention which would apply also to ,jus 
relictae, and seem to be substantially accurate. 
It is, of course, obviously absurd to contend 
that today legitim and_jus relictae are rights of 
division of common property held in partnership by 
the husband, wife, and children, since there is no 
longer any conjugal communion of goods in Scotland. 
But, at the same time, it is equally incorrect to 
describe these rights either as mere debts or as 
rights of succession. The truth is that the trend 
of legislation, actuated no doubt to some extent by 
the misconceptions of our jurists, has put these 
rights in a peculiarly anomalous position, so that 
they are now really almost a blend of the thre( 
different/ 
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different theories which have been formed as to their 
original nature. In their essence, however, it 
appears to be quite clear that, from a species of 
right by survivorship, they soon became, and for a long 
time remained rights of division of a conjugal commun- 
ity of goods. 
It is also incorrect to regard legitim and 
jus relictae as restrictions on freedom of testation 
in Scotland, for, if they did not exist in this country 
before testation was known, their introduction must 
have been practically coeval with it, and consequently 
prevented it having ever extended to a man's whole 
estate. The more correct view is to realise that in 
Scotland the power of testing has, from its introduc- 
-tion, never been extended to more than one third of 
a man's whole estate, where he had both a wife and 
children, and not to regard the indefeasible portions 
of the wife and children as having been created to 
limit the power of testing. 
With regard to the statutory rights of jus 
relict' and legitim from the Mother's estate, it is 
almost impossible to form any theory as to their 
nature. It is doubtful if even their creators had 
any theory as to whether they were inventing new 
rights of succession, additional debts against a 
deceased's executry, or adding to the then scheme of 
division of deceaseds' estates. It seems more pro - 
-bable that they thought only of creating counterparts 
of jus relictae and the older legitim. The Married 
Women's 'Property ( Scotland) Act 1881, which created these 
new rigghts, declares that they shall be the same as the 
older/ 
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older rights, "according to the law and practice of 
Scotland, and subject always to the same rulos of law 
in relation to the nature and amount of such share and 
interest, and the exclusion, discharge or satisfaction 
thereof, as the case may be." It would therefore seem 
that these later rights have, since their creation, 
occupied the same anomalous position which is held 
today by jus relictae and the older legitim. 
In connection with the right of legitim from the 
Mother's estate, it is interesting to note Bankton's 
contention that, in his day, the Mother's estate really 
contributed to the legitim, since it. :was immixed with 
the father's property, and the children took one third 
or one half of the joint estate. 
There is, however, this difference between the 
newer and the older rights, namely, that,whereas the 
latter existed before testation was recognised, the 
former are undoubtedly restrictions on freedom of 
testation in Scotland. 
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V. 
The Nature of Terce and Courtesy. 
There does not appear to have been so much diver- 
sity of opinion among Scottish Jurists as to the nature 
of terce and courtesy. These rights have always been 
regarded in this country simply as legal liferents, but, 
on the Continent, Jurists are at variance as to whether 
dower (to give terce its more widely known name) and 
courtesy are to be attributed to the doctrine of a con- 
jugal community, or are, as the French lawyers gener- 
ally style them, gains de survie - rights by survivor- 
-ship. 
There certainly appears to be some ground for 
describing dower as an offshoot of the community 
doctrine, for although, from a very early time, there 
appears to have been present the idea of making some 
provision for the wife after her husband's death, dower 
was originally the price paid by the husband for the 
privileges which marriage would give him over her estate. 
At the same time, the wife had the counter benefit of 
one third or one half of the joint property on the 
husband's death, so that dower would really appear to 
have been an additional provision for widowhood, and also 
to serve as a resource in the event of the husband 
disposing, or being deprived of the whole conjugal 
estate in his lifetime, so as to leave nothing for the 
widow on his death. This seems to have been the view 
taken of dower by the Church, and to have accounted for 
the support it received from the latter, and for its 
later/ 
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later attribution to an ecclesiastical origin. It is 
difficult, however, to see how this right could be 
regarded as a right by survivorship, since originally 
it was given to the wife in her lifetime, unless this 
view did not mature until dower arose only on the death 
of the husband. 
The nature of courtesy is almost more difficult 
still to determine. Some writers are of the opinion 
that it is an alimentary provision to the husband 
corresponding to the wife's dower, but such a view has 
little to support it, although the fact that, in 
Normandy, courtesy was allowed only so. long as the 
husband remained a widower, would seem to lend some 
credence to this contention. It would, however, seem 
out of proportion to allow the husband the liferent 
of the whole of the wife's inherited heritable estate, 
when a liferent of only one third is allowed in dower. 
Moreover it would be inconsistent that such an alimen- 
-tary provision should be dependent on the birth of a 
live child. 'Others hold that it is a reward for pre- 
-senting the state with a child, and the Mother with 
an heir. Certainly, at first sight, courtesy appears 
to he allowed on account of fatherhood, rather than as 
the privilege of a husband. Those who attribute it to 
the community doctrine say that it is a result of the 
predominance of the husband in regard to the management 
of the family _property. similar view is taken by 
Erskine, who holds that courtesy is 'Á imply an extension, 
after the wife's death, of the husband's jus mariti. 
But, if this is so, how is the insuperable condition 
that a live child must be born of the marriage to be 
explained? 
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Were it not for the fact that the child does not 
require to live, but merely to have been born alive, it 
seems possible that this theory might be explained thus: - 
If no child was born, the conjugal partnership would be 
dissolved at the wife's death and there would be no fur - 
-ther interests for the husband to look after. The 
birth of a child, however, who is the Mother's heir, 
would continue the partnership after her death, and 
necessitate the a dministration of the child's share. 
'The Father, having fulfilled this function in the wife's 
lifetime, it would be but right that he should continue 
do so after her death. As a reward for his trouble, 
and possibly also in order that he may not abuse the 
wife's estate, he is allowed the liferent of her heri- 
-tage. Such an explanation, however, will scarcely 
stand in view of the fact that courtesy is allowed 
though the child dies in infancy, and does not survive 
the Mother. There is also the additional objection 
that, if the child survived the Mother but became 
forisfamiliated, there would be no further excuse for 
the 'Father's administration of this part of the con - 
-jugal estate, nor consequently for his enjoyment of 
the liferent of it.. 
As has already been mentioned, Brissaud's 
explanation of courtesy in Normandy, (from which 
country we undoubtedly derived it) Angou, and Maine 
is that it was the marriage portion of the wife, which 
was allowed to the husband on her death. The reason 
for this may be better comprehended by regarding the 
"Counter- Increase" -- the courtesy of the countries of 
written law. This was allowed to the widower as a set- 
-off against the "Increase" or dower, which was given 
by/ 
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by him to the widow and added to and increased her 
marriage portion. If Brissaud's view is correct, 
courtesy was simply a set -off against dower. The 
reason for it being a more extensive provision than 
dower is probably to be explained by the husband's 
predominance. This theory, , however, does not account 
for the requirement that a live child should be born 
of the marriage. It is possible, however, as has 
already been suggested, that this condition did not 
originally govern courtesy, but came into being later 
through the mere force of some custom. Professor 
Walton thinks that the proof of live birth which was 
required, namely that the child must be heard to cry, 
is ;justified by immemorial custom rather than reason. 
May not this also be the explanation of the condition 
that the live birth of a child was necessary to 
entitle the husband to courtesy? 
Although it is difficult to-say with any cer- 
-tainty which of these theories is the correct one, 
there seems little doubt that courtesy was a right by 
survivorship, though it can probably be linked to some 
extent with the system of family law which revolved 
round the doctrine of a conjugal community. 
